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BREASTFEEDING ON A NICKEL AND A DIME: WHY
THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S NURSING MOTHERS
AMENDMENT WON’T HELP LOW-WAGE WORKERS
Nancy Ehrenreich* with Jamie Siebrase**
As part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (also known as
“Obamacare”), Congress passed a new law requiring employers to provide accom-
modation to working mothers who want to express breast milk while at work. This
accommodation requirement is a step forward from the preceding legal regime, under
which federal courts consistently found that “lactation discrimination” did not con-
stitute sex discrimination. But this Article predicts that the new law will neverthe-
less fall short of guaranteeing all women the ability to work while breastfeeding.
The generality of the Act’s brief provisions, along with the broad discretion it
assigns to employers to determine the details of the accommodation provided, make
it likely that class- and race-inflected attitudes towards both breastfeeding and
women’s roles will influence employer (and possibly judicial) decisions in this area.
Examining psychological studies of popular attitudes towards breastfeeding, as well
as the history of women’s relationships to work, this Article concludes that both are
likely to negatively affect low-income women seeking accommodation under the
Act, perhaps especially those who are African-American. In short, the new law
could lead to a two-tiered system of breastfeeding access, encouraging employers to
grant generous accommodations to economically privileged women and increasing
the social pressure on low-income women to breastfeed, without meaningfully im-
proving the latter group’s ability to do so.
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INTRODUCTION
Even though accommodating breastfeeding actually saves employers
money,1 they frequently retaliate against or fire employees for breastfeeding
or pumping breast milk at work—or even for merely asking to nurse or
pump.2 And even though the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)3 de-
fines unequal treatment of pregnant women as sex discrimination, federal
1. Employers who accommodate breastfeeding benefit from fewer health claims, reduced
training budgets, and lower direct and indirect costs of missed days from work. Marsha Walker,
Breastfeeding and Employment: Making It Work, WIC ESSENTIALS NEWSLETTER, June 2011, http:/
/www.ibreastfeeding.com/newsletter/newsletter/2011/06/breastfeeding-and-employment-
making-it-work. See also, Sarah Andrews, Lactation Breaks in the Workplace: What Employers Need
to Know About the Nursing Mothers Amendment to the FLSA, 30 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMP. L. J.
121, 149–55 (2012) (noting various benefits for employers and describing money savings by
CIGNA); Rona Cohen et al., Comparison of Maternal Absenteeism and Infant Illness Rates Among
Breast-feeding and Formula-feeding Women in Two Corporations, 10 AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION
148, 153 (1995) (“[W]omen who breast-feed their babies are less likely to be absent from work
because of baby-related illnesses and less likely to have long absences when they do miss
work. . . .”).
2. See, e.g., EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 118 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 891
(2013).
3. The PDA amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the central federal
statute governing sex, race, and other types of discrimination in the workplace. It defines dis-
crimination on the basis of pregnancy or “related medical conditions” as sex discrimination. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
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courts have consistently rejected suits seeking redress for lactation discrimi-
nation.4 Breastfeeding, the courts have held, is not a “pregnancy-related
medical condition” under the PDA, and breastfeeding discrimination is
not illegal under Title VII because lactating women are not similarly situ-
ated to men.5
Moreover, while it may appear to some that the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA)—also known as “Obamacare”—
could make these holdings obsolete, this Article maintains that it won’t. In
its Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers provision (amending the
Fair Labor Standards Act), the ACA changes federal employment law’s ap-
proach to lactation from a formal equality, “sameness” model (giving
women only the right to be treated the same as similarly situated men), to
a substantive equality, “difference” model (mandating accommodation of
lactation at work).6 As such, the new law seems to promise a solution to
the breastfeeding problem—preventing formalistic judicial applications of
the sameness/difference distinction within equality jurisprudence by estab-
lishing, by law, that equality in this area requires recognition of difference.7
Nevertheless, while the ACA represents a salutary development in
the law (for the reasons just stated), this Article argues that heralding the
new statute as the death knell for breastfeeding discrimination in the work-
place would be premature. Instead, there is every reason to expect that
commonly held assumptions about breastfeeding, breasts, and women’s ap-
propriate relationships to work will negatively impact employer, employee,
4. There has been some discussion of terminology here. As Nicole Orozco notes,
“[b]ecause lactation is the body’s natural physical response to pregnancy, unlike the parental
choice to breastfeed, lactation is more clearly [seen as] related to pregnancy,” Nicole Kennedy
Orozco, Pumping at Work: Protection from Lactation Discrimination in the Workplace, 71 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1281, 1313 (2010). See discussion of whether lactation is “related” to pregnancy, infra Part I.
However, because that insight is tangential to the material covered here, I will use the two terms
interchangeably. Thus, the terms “lactation discrimination” and “breastfeeding discrimination”
will both be used to refer to discrimination against women who seek to express milk or
breastfeed at work as well as to discrimination against women because of the mere physiological
fact that they are lactating.
5. See infra Part I.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) (2014). Specifically, the statute amends the Fair Labor Standards
Act to require employers to provide lactating employees both a private place in which to
breastfeed or pump milk and reasonable (unpaid) break time to do so. See infra Part II(B). Nearly
half the states have also passed workplace breastfeeding statutes, Orozco, supra note 4, at 1291,
but this Article will focus on the federal law.
7. In requiring affirmative accommodation of breastfeeding (an activity engaged in only
by women), the statute implicitly recognizes women as differently situated from men and as
entitled to differential treatment—sometimes referred to as “special” treatment. On the distinc-
tion between sameness- and difference-based definitions of discrimination, see generally MARTHA
CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 39-44 (2d ed., 2003). See also Cal.
Sav. and Loan v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 286 (1987) (holding that a pregnancy disability leave
statute does not violate Title VII).
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and judicial behavior under the new federal accommodation regime.8 The
result could be perpetuation of an already-emerging two-tiered system of
access to breastfeeding for working women.
The Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers provision dele-
gates broad discretion to employers to tailor accommodations to their em-
ployees’ needs.9 While this approach might seem at first blush to be the
best way to assure appropriate treatment of each individual woman, such
broad discretion could also allow cultural bias10 against breastfeeding work-
ers to produce cramped and ungenerous accommodations. Focusing on
how race- and class-bias—as well as material economic realities—might
affect the operation of the new breastfeeding system “on the ground,” this
Article concludes that the turn to accommodation is unlikely to signifi-
cantly improve the ability of low-wage workers to breastfeed while contin-
uing to work—if they choose to do so.
As the “if” in the previous sentence implies, the complexities of ex-
isting cultural beliefs and economic realities suggest the need for caution in
framing policy goals in this area. A policy assessment of the issue of
breastfeeding and work must consider how race and class status affect the
assumptions about, preferences of, and mothering norms imposed upon,
different types of women. And it must reject simplistic accounts that ignore
the impact of race, class, and gender on the options available to breastfeed-
ing workers.11 Thus, my concern in this Article is not to convince women
8. Legal opinions about lactation, like legal opinions about pregnancy, abortion, and
other aspects of women’s reproductive lives, can be understood as the products of complex and
often unconscious assumptions about women’s bodies, roles, and relationships to the workplace.
See generally, Nancy Ehrenreich, Introduction, in THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS READER: LAW,
MEDICINE, & THE CONSTRUCTION OF MOTHERHOOD 7-9 (Nancy Ehrenreich ed., 2008) (dis-
cussing impact of stereotypes on reproductive rights law). Judicial holdings on breastfeeding at
work reflect and participate in larger social conversations, and social struggles, about women’s
place in society. Thus, socially constructed notions of embodiment and entitlement are likely to
affect the law’s interpretation, regardless of whether future cases are governed by formal equality
or substantive equality norms.
9. See infra Part II(B)(1).
10. By “cultural bias,” I mean to include both conscious and unconscious attitudes, as
well as both direct and indirect impacts of such attitudes. Direct impacts can flow from explicitly
negative assumptions about certain categories of people (e.g., women who breastfeed are not
good workers). Indirect impacts can result when attitudes that are not explicitly negative or
pejorative nevertheless lead to harmful treatment of individuals or to structural inequality (e.g.,
breastfeeding is a sexual activity that should not be done in public). On cognitive, or uncon-
scious, bias, see Linda H. Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1182-88 (1995)
(describing how unconscious stereotyping can affect decisions in employment context); David
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 903-15 (1993) (describing stud-
ies finding a high prevalence of unconscious racism among whites consciously committed to
non-discrimination).  On specific attitudes towards breastfeeding and women who breastfeed, see
infra Part II(A).
11. See infra Part II(B)(3) (noting the likely negative impact of the ACA on low-income
women, and focusing in particular on African-American women).
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to breastfeed (or, for that matter, not to breastfeed).12 Nor is it to en-
courage women to choose one or the other of the two (equally inade-
quate) options many currently have (and are likely to continue to have):
either to stay at work and forego breastfeeding or to forego working and
breastfeed.13 Rather, my concern is to increase the possibility that each
woman will be able to do what she thinks is best for herself, her child, and
her family—and to examine the barriers to achieving that goal.
In addition to identifying the potential impact that cultural attitudes
about breastfeeding could have on various stake holders under the ACA,
this Article also notes that, to the extent the statute fails to significantly
assist low-income women, it will perpetuate a longstanding labor regime
that has often forced such women to sacrifice the broader well-being14 of
their families in order to feed them. As will be discussed further below,
there is a significant risk that the new regime will have the effect of in-
creasing social pressure on such women to breastfeed, without meaning-
fully improving their ability to do so.15 In fact, the pro-breastfeeding
stance of the ACA might ultimately negatively affect the autonomy, safety,
and health of low-income mothers and their children.
Of course, to the extent that the new law has such disparately nega-
tive impacts on low-income workers, it will have a disparately negative
racial impact as well. Since low-income groups in the United States are
disproportionately (although not predominantly) of color,16 to say that the
law will not help low-income women is also to say that it will be of limited
utility to many women of color. Focusing on the ACA’s likely impact on
low-income African-American women, this Article also highlights the
racialization of attitudes about bodies, work, and gender roles, noting vari-
ous ways that such racialization could impact the ability (and possibly the
desire) of Black mothers to combine breastfeeding and work.
12. While breastfeeding has many benefits for mother and infant, see generally KAREN M.
KEDROWSKI & MICHAEL E. LIPSCOMB, BREASTFEEDING RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 8-14
(2008) (describing those benefits), some authors have suggested that those benefits might be
overstated. See, e.g., JOAN B. WOLF, IS BREAST BEST? TAKING ON THE BREASTFEEDING EX-
PERTS AND THE NEW HIGH STAKES OF MOTHERHOOD 21–45 (2011). And in any event, as this
Article will discuss, decisions about breastfeeding, especially for working mothers, are mul-
tifaceted, complex and highly individual.
13. See discussion, infra Part III(A).
14. As they define “well-being,” of course.
15. See infra Part III(B).
16. The majority of individuals living below the poverty line are “non-Hispanic whites”
but far from the majority of whites are poor, with just 12.7% of whites living below the poverty
line. In contrast, African-Americans, who represent approximately 13% of the U.S. population,
account for 27.2% of the poor, while 25.6% of the poor are Latinas/os. Drew DeSilver, Who’s
Poor in American? 50 Years into the “War on Poverty,” a Data Portrait, Pew Research Center,
available at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/13/whos-poor-in-america-50-
years-into-the-war-on-poverty-a-data-portrait/.
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Three likely dynamics form the basis for this Article’s prediction that
low-income women will not benefit significantly from the ACA. First,
cultural attitudes about lactation (to be discussed further below), while
broadly detrimental to breastfeeding women as a group, might be particu-
larly harmful to low-wage women, affecting both their choices about
breastfeeding (perhaps especially the choices of African-American women)
and their treatment by employers and judges. Second, to the extent that
such biases result in restrictive interpretations of the ACA, the financial
impact on low-income women will be particularly detrimental.17 As a re-
sult of these first two dynamics, the ultimate (and ironic) impact of the
new law might be a two-tiered system in which the women it is designed
to aid actually have significantly less ability to breastfeed than higher-in-
come working women.
Third, the formal state embrace of breastfeeding represented by the
statute risks becoming part of the already-extant disciplinary system under
which low-income women are surveilled and regulated to determine
whether they live up to governmental standards of good mothering—stan-
dards that often fail to take their constraints, concerns, and circumstances
into account.18 As Angela Davis has noted (in discussing contraception),
rights granted to economically privileged, white women have a way of
morphing into duties when applied to low-income women of color.19
Thus, the real possibility exists that poor women who bottle feed, perhaps
especially those stigmatized by “racialized perceptions of mothering,”20
will be judged to have neglected their children at the same time that both
financial realities and cultural attitudes might make it more difficult and/or
less appealing for them (as compared to economically privileged, Euro-
pean-American women) to breastfeed.21
For all three of these reasons—cultural bias, material realities, and
stigma—observers concerned about both equal access to work and equal
rights for mothers should be wary of complacency about the impact of the
ACA. Vigilance, continued activism, and additional law reform will be
needed to assure that all working mothers who desire to breastfeed have
meaningful opportunities to do so under the new regulatory regime.
17. See infra Part II(A)(4) and Part III(A)(3).
18. On the state surveillance and regulation of poor women, see generally, ANGE-MARIE
HANCOCK, THE POLITICS OF DISGUST: THE PUBLIC IDENTITY OF THE WELFARE QUEEN
(2004) (analyzing rhetoric and content of the Clinton-era welfare reforms); DOROTHY ROB-
ERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY
172–76 (1997) (discussing racial bias in prosecution of pregnant women for drug use); CAROL B.
STACK, ALL OUR KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY 124–27 (1974)
(describing how child-fostering and other traditional Black practices have been misunderstood
by welfare workers as parental irresponsibility).
19. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, & CLASS 221 (1981).
20. BERNICE L. HAUSMAN, MOTHER’S MILK: BREASTFEEDING CONTROVERSIES IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 46 (2003).
21. See, e.g., discussion, infra notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
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Part II of this Article provides an overview of the accommodation
approach introduced by the ACA, briefly comparing the prior formal
equality regime of Title VII and the PDA with the current one. It also
summarizes the two main arguments courts have proffered to support their
position that breastfeeding discrimination does not violate Title VII and/
or the PDA. Those arguments, I suggest, are so strained (and punitive) that
they raise the distinct possibility that cultural attitudes towards lactation
and women’s roles—perhaps operating unconsciously—influenced the
reasoning and results of at least some of these decisions. This Article main-
tains that there is little reason to doubt that such attitudes will contribute
to problematic interpretations of the ACA as well.
Accordingly, Parts III and IV identify two different types of cultural
content that may have influenced the earlier generation of lactation dis-
crimination cases and are likely to affect interpretations of the new statute:
attitudes about breastfeeding and attitudes about the appropriate relation-
ship of women to work. Part III first surveys the psychological findings on
prevailing attitudes towards lactating women and breastfeeding. Those atti-
tudes, I argue, construct breastfeeding as fundamentally incompatible with
work. They also are likely to have an inflated negative effect on low-in-
come (perhaps especially African-American) women, intersecting in
harmful ways with prevailing stereotypes of such women.
Part III next identifies aspects of the ACA’s rule framework that cre-
ate the space in which culture is likely to play a role, as well as ways in
which prevailing attitudes about breastfeeding might cause cramped inter-
pretations of particular provisions of the statute. Moreover, this Part argues,
the narrow interpretations of the statute made possible by its gaps,22 as well
as the employer violations of the law made possible by the statute’s weak
enforcement mechanism, are likely to have a disparately negative impact
on low-income workers. This section also notes that, if low-income
women do not find combining work and breastfeeding to be a viable op-
tion, their financial situations will probably preclude staying home to
breastfeed. Thus, the financial incentives likely to be created by a narrow
interpretation of the ACA could produce a full-fledged two-tiered system,
wherein privileged women are more able (as compared to economically
marginalized women)23 both to combine work and breastfeeding and to
nurse without working (if they so desire).24
22. Of course, language always leaves room for interpretation, and by suggesting that gaps
in this statute invite cultural attitudes to influence judicial outcomes, I do not mean to suggest
that (for example) a rule-intensive revision of the law would eliminate the role of culture in
producing legal meaning.
23. The terms “economically marginalized” and “marginalized” are used in this Article to
refer to those who are poor, low-income, of color, and/or working class.
24. There are some data that support the validity of this assumption: “African-American
mothers of infants have higher rates of labor force participation (66%) than their non-Hispanic
white (57%), Latina (45%) and Asian/Pacific Islander (56%) sisters, which may explain their
lower rates of breastfeeding, especially if they are not in professional positions with considerable
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Part IV discusses a second set of cultural understandings that are likely
to influence employer and judicial interpretations of the ACA, thereby
contributing to entrenchment of the two-tiered system of breastfeeding
access predicted here. That two-tiered outcome, if it comes to pass, will
replicate the labor roles that have historically been assigned to economi-
cally privileged and low-income women, respectively. It is well known by
now that until the 1970s some women were routinely excluded from the
workplace. It is also well known, but less frequently mentioned, that others
have instead historically been considered appropriate (if inadequate) work-
ers and have been discouraged from staying home with their children.
Thus, although feminists like myself often say that the workplace is struc-
tured around a “male” model that didn’t change to accommodate (privi-
leged) women when they entered the economic sphere, it might not be
too far of a stretch to suggest that the modern industrialized workplace was
actually designed with low-income women in mind—that it is explicitly struc-
tured to appropriate the labor of such women (and their male counter-
parts), at the expense of their families.
Thus, Part IV discusses how stereotypes about low-income women as
both workers and mothers have obscured and legitimated their economic
exploitation for centuries. It also predicts that such stereotypes will simi-
larly obscure and legitimate the negative impacts of the ACA, making lim-
ited accommodations seem appropriate in low-income workplaces and
allowing the resulting lower breastfeeding rates in such families to be dis-
missed as evidence of inadequate mothering. In short, the ACA will con-
vey the message that breastfeeding is good mothering at the same time as it
prevents (or at least fails to enable) precisely the women who are so often
stereotyped as bad mothers from engaging in it. Lastly, Part V draws some
brief conclusions.
I. THE MOVE FROM FORMAL EQUALITY TO ACCOMMODATION
The ACA represents a significant change in the federal government’s
approach to regulating employers’ treatment of women who choose to
breastfeed while employed. As noted above, before the passage of the Act,
federal regulation related to breastfeeding was accomplished primarily
through the formal equality regime of Title VII and the PDA.25 Under
those statutes, women workers are entitled only to protection from differ-
ential treatment—from being treated differently than similarly situated
autonomy.” KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 12, at 17. Moreover, “one of the primary
predictors of the duration of breastfeeding is when a woman returns to work.” Id. at 66. “Studies
of employed women find that those with the most professional autonomy are best able to balance
the competing needs of breastfeeding and outside employment.” Id. at 71.
25. Lactation discrimination cases have also been litigated under the ADA and the FMLA.
See, e.g., Bond v. Sterling, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 306 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a mother was
not terminated for taking leave under the FMLA); Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp.2d 305
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that breastfeeding is not a disability covered by the ADA).
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men. They have no right to demand lactation accommodation from their
employers. In contrast, the ACA creates a positive right to accommoda-
tion, imposing affirmative duties on employers to address certain needs of
breastfeeding women. Especially given the courts’ cramped interpretation
of the “equal treatment” right under Title VII and the PDA, this turn to a
substantive equality approach is a positive development. But, as will be
discussed further below, it is not a panacea.26
The first component of the formal equality regime, Title VII, pro-
hibits discrimination on the basis of sex in the terms and conditions of
work. The second component, the PDA, defines “on the basis of sex” to
include treatment based on pregnancy or “related medical conditions.”27
Yet federal courts have almost uniformly concluded that neither provision
protects women from being fired, harassed, or retaliated against for
breastfeeding or pumping breast milk at work.28  Breastfeeding, they hold,
is not a “pregnancy-related medical condition” under the PDA, and
breastfeeding women are not “similarly situated” to men, making their
differential treatment permissible under Title VII. In so holding, the courts
rely on the infamous case of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert29—the case that
Congress passed the PDA to overturn.30 Using the same warped (and
widely discredited) version of equal treatment reasoning that the Supreme
Court used in Gilbert, they rule that breastfeeding discrimination does not
constitute sex discrimination, because lactation is an activity unique to
women. Thus, breastfeeding-based employment actions do not differen-
26. See infra, this Part, Part II(B)  and  Part III(B).
27. The PDA provides:
The terms “because of sex” or “on the basis of sex” include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work.
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (1978).
28. See, e.g., cases discussed infra at notes 31–42. By “breastfeeding discrimination,” I
mean suffering harassment, retaliation, or tangible employment action because of breastfeeding
or pumping breast milk, or seeking to do so, at work.
29. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
30. For a critique of courts’ application of the Gilbert reasoning in the breastfeeding con-
text, see Camille Hébert, The Causal Relationship of Sex, Pregnancy, Lactation, and Breastfeeding and
the Meaning of “Because of Sex” under Title VII, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 119, 130-36 (2011); see
also infra, notes 39–43 and accompanying text; Judith G. Greenberg, “The Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act: Legitimating Discrimination Against Pregnant Women in the Workforce,” 50 ME.
L. REV. 226, 234-36 (1998).
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tially treat similarly situated employees, but rather differentially treat two
different groups of people—those who breastfeed and those who do not.31
A brief look at some of the leading Title VII/PDA cases gives a flavor
of the type of treatment women who feed breast milk often receive in the
workplace, as well as a sense of the courts’ uncharitable reactions to their
claims. In one of the most well-known cases, Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co.,32
the plaintiff’s infant actually faced health issues that required her to
breastfeed.33 Martha Rene Wallace, an accounting clerk, requested six
weeks unpaid leave because her baby was refusing to take a bottle. When
her employer denied her request, she chose to stay home rather than com-
promise her infant’s health—and was subsequently fired. The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendant, stating that “Pyro’s decision
does not deny anyone personal leave on the basis of sex—it merely
removes one situation, breastfeeding, from those for which personal leave
will be granted.”34 To qualify under the PDA, the court asserted, a medical
condition must be incapacitating (to the woman).35 There is no “valid
comparison,” the court went on, “between incapacitated workers and
‘young mothers wishing to nurse little babies’”36—a rather striking char-
acterization in a case where the plaintiff claimed that her child would es-
sentially starve if she were not able to breastfeed. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed, holding that because breastfeeding is not a “medical necessity”
Pyro’s policy of not granting personal leave for breastfeeding did not con-
stitute sex discrimination in violation of the PDA.
In Martinez v. NBC,37 the plaintiff was an associate producer at
MSNBC Cable. She alleged that her employer had failed to provide her a
safe and secure place to express milk and that, when she complained about
co-workers repeatedly entering the office where she was pumping, she was
31. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Regent Assisted Living, Inc., No. CV-98-564-ST, 1999 WL
373790, at *29–30 (D. Or. Apr. 9, 1999); Barrash v Bowen, 846 F. 2d 927, 931-32 (4th Cir.
1988).
32. 951 F.2d 351 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision).
33. See also McNill v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 950 F. Supp. 564, 569-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding that employer’s refusal to grant employee leave to nurse her infant with cleft palate is
not governed by PDA).
34. Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky. 1990).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 870 (quoting Barrash, 846 F.2d at 931–32). The full quote from Barrash is in-
structive: “One can draw no valid comparison between people, male and female, suffering ex-
tended incapacity from illness or injury and young mothers wishing to nurse little babies.”  The
court’s comparison clearly suggests that it sees the need of an infant for breast milk as far less
pressing than the need of a worker, male or female, to recover from an injury, however minor or
serious that injury may be. Otherwise, the employer’s disparate treatment of the two would
certainly suggest the possibility of sex discrimination. See also KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra
note 12, at 76 (noting that Barrash has been cited by breastfeeding advocates “as an example of
courts and judges that are hostile to a woman’s decision to breastfeed.”).
37. 49 F. Supp. 2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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subjected to retaliatory schedule changes, demotion, and verbal harass-
ment. The district court for the Southern District of New York granted
defendant’s motion for summary judgment, holding that, “[t]he drawing
of distinctions among persons of one gender on the basis of criteria that are
immaterial to the other . . . is not the sort of behavior covered by Title
VII.”38 “As there were and could be no men with the same characteristic
[as the plaintiff],” the court said, “all that is left, assuming the truth of
Martinez’s allegations, is a work environment hostile to breast pumping,
not a work environment that subjected women to treatment less favorable
than was meted out to men.”39 Citing the much-maligned Gilbert case, the
court therefore concluded that there could be no finding of sex
discrimination.40
As Camille Hébert has pointed out, the doctrinal reasoning used in
the lactation cases that rely upon Gilbert is seriously flawed.41 It is ludicrous
to suggest, for example, that discrimination based on a trait unique to
women does not constitute sex discrimination: “[I]f an employer refused
to hire persons with penises, it would be difficult for the employer to de-
fend its action on the ground that it could not have discriminated against
men because generally only men and not women have penises.”42 Simi-
larly, while many courts simply state with virtually no explanation that
lactation is not a medical condition related to pregnancy,43 such formalistic
interpretations ignore the underlying goal of the PDA (and Title VII)—to
provide women equal employment opportunity. It makes just as much
sense (and is fairer and more consistent with Title VII’s underlying pur-
poses) to conclude as the court did in EEOC v. Houston Funding II. Ltd.,44
that since lactation is a physiological result of pregnancy and childbirth, it
should be considered to be covered by the PDA. Moreover, the inclusive
language of the statute (“The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions . . . “45) strongly suggests that Con-
gress intended a generous interpretation of the provision’s scope.
Given the incredibly strained judicial interpretations of formal equal-
ity principles present in the Title VII/PDA cases, the ACA’s move to a
38. Id. at 309.
39. Id. at 311.
40. Id. at 310-11. See also Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 932 (4th Cir. 1988) (“Any
limitation upon the liberality with which leave without pay had been granted in earlier years
would have an adverse impact upon young mothers wishing to nurse their babies for six months,
but that is not the kind of disparate impact that would invalidate the [narrowing of the leave]
rule, for it shows no less favorable treatment of women than of men.”).
41. Hébert, supra note 30, at 144-45.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp.  867, 869 (W.D.Ky. 1990).
44. 717 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 2013).
45. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k) (1978) (emphasis added).
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substantive equality model, imposing affirmative duties on employers to
accommodate the needs of breastfeeding women, is clearly a salutary one
for women who wish to combine work and breastfeeding.46  By defining
women’s rights in terms of equality of results rather than equality of op-
portunity, the ACA implicitly acknowledges that requiring only that
women be treated the same as men makes men’s needs the standard for fair
treatment. Moreover, by specifically recognizing women’s difference as en-
titling them to certain treatment, the new law limits the courts’ ability to
use formalistic doctrinal analysis to conclude that such difference precludes a
finding of discrimination.
But an accommodation approach is not a panacea, as experience has
shown. First, to the extent that accommodation requirements and other
substantive equality rules are premised (implicitly, if not explicitly) on the
notion that women are different from men (thus deserving different treat-
ment), in a liberal society dedicated to formal equality understandings of
discrimination they can generate resentment from both co-workers and
employers.47 Existing as they do in a formal equality society in which legal
doctrine (as well as much popular opinion) sees formally equal treatment as
the paradigm of fairness, substantive equality provisions have the potential
to be perceived as illegitimate “special treatment” or “reverse discrimina-
tion.”48 In addition, as Rachel Arnow-Richman has noted, formal equal-
ity ways of thinking have a tendency to bleed into accommodation
regimes, diluting their effect.49 Thus, there is a significant risk that the
rights created by the ACA will not be interpreted expansively, by either
employers or the courts. Lastly, an accommodation approach elides the
need for more fundamental change, suggesting that piecemeal accommo-
dation of particular needs is sufficient to provide real equality to women
workers. As Colleen Sheppard has noted, “Designing workplace objectives
around an ideal worker who has a man’s body and men’s traditional immu-
nity from family caregiving discriminates against women. Eliminating that
46. The formal equality model requires only that women be treated the same as men,
whereas a substantive equality approach seeks not to assure that women are subjected to exactly
the same treatment as men but rather that they are treated as is required to produce the result of
equal access to the workplace. However, neither of these two approaches guarantees good results,
for each is subject to interpretation. See generally, CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 110–16 (1979) (discussing
the indeterminacy of these two approaches to defining discrimination).
47. See Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1151–54 (1986).
48. In her still-relevant critique of antidiscrimination law, Catharine MacKinnon dis-
cusses this objection and shows why “reverse discrimination” labeling is an inevitable result of
the prevailing “differences”-based notion of equality. MACKINNON, supra note 46 at 118-19.
49. Rachel Arnow-Richman, Accommodation Subverted: The Future of Work/Family Initia-
tives in a “Me, Inc.” World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 345, 362 (2003).
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ideal is not ‘accommodation’; it is the minimum requirement for gender
equality.”50
In addition to the shortcomings just identified, and even though the
ACA represents a positive change from the formal equality regime, nega-
tive cultural understandings of breastfeeding are likely to preclude the sort
of expansive interpretation of the statute that would be necessary (along
with literal expansion of statutory rights) to provide meaningful access to
breastfeeding by all women who work. In fact, the nearly comical argu-
ments that courts have martialed to defend their interpretations of Title
VII, combined with the harmful concrete impact that those rulings have
had on women, strongly suggest that a powerful cultural component may
have influenced the reasoning and outcomes of many of the Title VII/
PDA cases.51 And there is no reason to think that the influence of cultural
attitudes about breastfeeding will be eliminated (or even lessened, necessa-
rily) under an accommodation regime.
II. THE ACA AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS BREASTFEEDING
To the degree that the realization of rights is always dependent on a
supporting culture, the continuing possibility of breastfeeding rights can-
not be disentangled from what they mean in the day to day conscious-
ness of various actors who affect decisions of whether or not to breastfeed.
– Karen M. Kedrowski & Michael E. Lipscomb52
The scope and substance of the rights created by the new federal law
will affect a variety of different actors. The law will affect women’s deci-
sions about whether to try to combine work and breastfeeding, employers’
decisions about what accommodations to afford to their workers, judges’
decisions about women’s and employers’ rights and responsibilities in this
area, and women’s decisions about whether to try to combine work and
breastfeeding. Because the ACA gives wide discretion to employers to de-
cide the parameters of the federal mandate, cultural attitudes are likely to
play a significant role in their accommodation decisions—and in judges’
50. COLLEEN SHEPPARD, INCLUSIVE LAW: THE RELATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF SYSTEMIC
DISCRIMINATION IN CANADA 26 (‘2010). Similarly, accommodating breastfeeding by giving
nursing women a pass on jury duty, as ten states do, KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 12, at
97, is a much less transformative approach to that issue than accommodating all adults primarily
responsible for young children (as six states do, id.) or restructuring courthouses and trial sched-
ules so as to allow nursing mothers to serve on juries (not to mention allowing nursing lawyers to
participate in trials). Cf id., at 113 (endorsing Hawaii’s approach, which defines nursing as a civil
right and prohibits employers from forbidding employees from doing it).
51. See, e.g., cases discussed in text at notes 32-40 and 61-63.
52. KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 12, at 115.
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assessment of those decisions.53 And employees’ awareness of the wide em-
ployer discretion in this area will in turn affect their decisions about
whether to try to combine breastfeeding and work.54 Hence, there is
plenty of room under the statute for cultural attitudes about breastfeeding
to have an impact. Section A of this Part describes the prevailing cultural
attitudes towards breastfeeding that could influence decision makers in this
area. Section B looks closely at the new statute to identify gaps and ambi-
guities in its provisions where cultural attitudes could easily play a role in
the law’s interpretation. Along with economic realities, those attitudes are
especially likely to impact the ability of working class and low-income
women to combine work and breastfeeding.
A. Cultural Attitudes Towards Breastfeeding
A variety of cultural understandings combine to construct breastfeed-
ing as incompatible with work. Those understandings could very well have
contributed to the prevailing legal view that breastfeeding discrimination is
not sex discrimination—and are likely to affect rulings under the new
ACA as well. A systematic (but unscientific) canvass of the psychological
literature on attitudes towards breastfeeding reveals three cultural attitudes
that are particularly relevant to the discussion here: (1) distrust; (2) aver-
sion; and (3) sexualization. All of these attitudes, I argue, make breastfeed-
ing seem incompatible with work.
Breastfeeding women are likely to be distrusted at work—in that
they’re seen as less competent and less committed than other employees.55
They’re likely to be treated with aversion in the sense that breastfeeding is
commonly seen as gross and unseemly— and therefore as something that
should only be done in private.56 Breastfeeding is also highly sexualized, so
that North Americans apparently have a very hard time separating the so-
ciety’s hypersexualization of the female breast from the bodily function of
lactation.57 For all these reasons, breastfeeding attitudes make the practice
seem incompatible with work.
1. Distrust
A key prevailing assumption about women who breastfeed or pump
at work—and about pregnant women in general—is that they are undedi-
53. To the extent that texts are never determinate, culture, of course, infuses all statutory
interpretation. But the generality of the ACA’s accommodation mandate makes the likelihood of
cultural influence on its application a particularly important consideration.
54. For example, awareness of certain cultural conceptions of breastfeeding might affect
women’s comfort levels in asking for accommodation.
55. See infra Part II(A)(1).
56. See infra Part II(A)(2).
57. See infra Part II(A)(3).
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cated, incompetent, and inappropriate workers.58 One survey of the litera-
ture on attitudes towards pregnant (not breastfeeding) workers found that
they are seen as “more emotional, irrational and less committed to their
jobs than [their] non-pregnant counterparts.”59 Similar conclusions have
been reached about attitudes towards breastfeeding women.60 The follow-
ing statement by the court in Barrash v. Bowen is evidence of such a dispar-
aging attitude: “[T]he measure of any duty of reasonable
accommodation,” the court declaims, “is not the same as the measure of
the mother’s right to care for her child as she pleases.”61 This statement
evinces the court’s belief that the plaintiff is inappropriately—and self-
ishly—putting the interests of her child ahead of those of her employer.
Such distrustful attitudes towards pregnant and lactating women (similar to
those applied to women who menstruate, by the way62) construct mother-
hood in general and nursing in particular as incompatible with being a
good worker.63
2. Aversion
Psychological studies about views on lactation have also found that,
“[P]eople perceive breastfeeding as largely negative, sexual, something
that animals do, and worthy of disgust.”64 At a minimum, many people see
it as unseemly, distasteful—something you do in the privacy of your own
home.65 Perhaps the reader will remember the episode of the television
58. Perhaps this stereotype is not surprising, given that mothers in general are distrusted at
work. See generally JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CON-
FLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 70 (2000) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER]
(noting that “women find that if they perform as ideal workers, they are condemned as bad
mothers; [but] if they observe the norm of parental care, they are condemned as bad workers.
Mothers can’t win.”).
59. Helen M. Pattison, Pregnancy and employment: the perceptions and beliefs of fellow workers,”
15 J. REPRO. & INFANT PSYCH. 303, 303 (1997).
60. See Susan E. Huhta, Elizabeth S. Westfall, & Joan C. Williams, Looking Forward and
Back: Using the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Discriminatory Gender/Pregnancy Stereotyping to
Challenge Discrimination Against New Mothers, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 303, 316–21 (2003).
61. Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 932 (4th Cir. 1988). For further discussion of this
quote, see infra, text accompanying note 219.
62. See Tomi-Ann Roberts, Jamie L. Goldenberg, Cathleen Power, & Tom Pyszcznski,
“Feminine Protection”: The Effects of Menstruation on Attitudes Towards Women, 26 PSYCH. OF
WOMEN QTRLY 131 (2002) (discussing negative social attitudes associated with menstruation
and menstruating women.).
63. Of course, to the extent that these stereotypes are applied to menstruation as well,
they construct femaleness—or at least being a fertile female—as incompatible with work. Thus,
not only being a mother but being a potential mother triggers distrust.
64. Michele Acker, Breast is Best. . .But Not Everywhere: Ambivalent Sexism and Attitudes
Toward Private and Public Breastfeeding, 61 SEX ROLES 476, 479 (2009).
65. These attitudes are shared by women as well as men. “[W]omen were more likely
than men to respond that they would be ‘offended’ or ‘highly offended’ if they saw a woman’s
breast and nipple exposed while breastfeeding, or her abdomen was showing, or they saw a
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sitcom, Friends, where Ross is revolted at the very thought of drinking
breast milk. Or maybe some readers heard about the flap over “Baby
Gaga” ice cream, made with breast milk66—and sold without the pop
star’s permission. The Lady (usually so decorum-resisting) was apparently
revolted,67 and threatened to sue.68
In addition to this recurring aversion to breast milk, however, most
people also know that it is good for babies.69 Thus, as one researcher sum-
marized, the public’s view is that: “The ideal mother breastfeeds, but not if
we have to see it.”70 Note, however, that the average infant needs to feed
every two to three hours.71 So, if breastfeeding (or pumping) should only
be done in private, then a breastfeeding worker is a complete oxymoron.72
This prevailing attitude of aversion towards lactation by definition con-
structs breastfeeding as incompatible with work. It also likely makes many
employers and employees loathe to discuss the practice. And, whereas
judges and employers might not be likely to openly express aversion, this
commonly held attitude might nevertheless unconsciously impact their
decisions.
woman breastfeeding a toddler.” KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 12, at 45. See also id., at
37 (“One survey found that one-quarter of mothers who decided to bottle feed did so because
breastfeeding is ‘embarrassing.’”).
66. Bill Chappell, Breast Milk Ice Cream Back on Sale; Lady Gaga May Sue, NPR INTERNA-
TIONAL NEWS (March 9, 2011, 11:40AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2011/03/
09/134389930/breast-milk-ice-cream-back-on-sale-lady-gaga-may-sue (“Lady Gaga had her at-
torneys fire off a letter to tell the shop to cease and desist from using the Baby Gaga name. The
letter calls the ice cream made from breast milk ‘deliberately provocative and, to many people,
nausea-inducing,’ and accuses the store of unfairly cashing in on [Gaga’s] name and image.”).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Rebecca D. Williams, Breast-Feeding Best Bet for Babies, FDA CONSUMER MAGA-
ZINE, Oct. 1995, http://www.bpni.org/Article/Breast-Feeding_Best_Bet_for_Babies.pdf. But
see JOAN B. WOLF, IS BREAST BEST?: TAKING ON THE BREASTFEEDING EXPERTS AND THE
NEW HIGH STAKES OF MOTHERHOOD 21-45 (2010). Wolf argues that women with a safe water
source can safely feed formula, and that the pressure to breastfeed “say[s] more about infatuation
with personal responsibility and perfect mothering in America than about the concrete benefits
of the breast.” Description of id., available at http://www.amazon.com/Breast-Best-Breastfeed-
ing-Motherhood-Biopolitics/dp/0814794815. It is beyond the scope of this Article to take sides
in this debate about the merits of breastfeeding. This Article proceeds on the assumption that
each woman is capable of making the appropriate decision for her family and that breastfeeding
should be accessible to any working woman who prefers to breastfeed her child.
70. Acker, supra note 64, at 488.
71. Id. at 477.
72. Unless, of course, the workplace is transformed into a site that readily and routinely
accommodates breastfeeding employees. But see supra, note 50 and accompanying text, for dis-
cussion of the inherent limitations to accommodation as a means of producing a truly inclusive
working environment.
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3. Sexualization
Popular revulsion towards breastfeeding might be related to the
hypersexualization of the breast in mainstream U.S. culture. The breast is
so sexualized here that it’s quite difficult for people to see breastfeeding as
primarily reproductive rather than sexual. The intrepid reader can search
Craigslist and find dozens of individuals seeking breastfeeding women for
sexual encounters.73 Breastfeeding pornography is also very popular.74
Moving to more public reactions, on Google one can find countless news-
paper and television items about women being harassed for breastfeeding
in public, with the harassers justifying their behavior by using words like
“indecent” and “flaunting” and the like.75 My own personal favorite ex-
ample is the case of the woman harassed by employees in a Target store in
Houston76 for breastfeeding in a store aisle, as opposed to in the dressing
room. The Target store’s policy allows breastfeeding only if it is “discreet”
(even though the applicable state law giving women the right to breastfeed
in public doesn’t require “discreetness”).77 The woman reported that,
when she called the Target corporate headquarters to complain, she “was
told by guest relations [that] ‘just because it’s a woman’s legal right to
nurse a baby in public doesn’t mean she should walk around the store
flaunting it.’”78
In short, the hypersexualization of the breast in U.S. culture makes
breastfeeding a fraught and disturbing practice to many people. Witness,
for example, the hoopla over the recent Time Magazine cover story about
73. See generally, Alison Bartlett, Maternal Sexuality and Breastfeeding, 5 SEX EDUCATION
67, 75-6 (2005) (discussing lactation pornography).
74. Id. (arguing that emergence of lactation pornography has relegated maternal sexuality
to realm of the immoral). As Bartlett’s piece implicitly suggests, it is not male sexual interest in
lactation per se that is problematic, but rather the pornographic (as opposed to erotic) nature and
tone of that sexualization in its current form. Cf. INA MAY GASKIN, SPIRITUAL MIDWIFERY
(2003) (containing many non-pornographic descriptions of couples’ use of erotic sexuality as a
mechanism for facilitating labor and birth).
75. See, e.g., Bettina Forbes, CLC, Target Employees Bully Breastfeeding Mom Despite Corpo-
rate Policy, BEST FOR BABES FOUNDATION, https://www.bestforbabes.org/target-employees-
bully-breastfeeding-mom-despite-corporate-policy.
76. Michelle Hickman, Mom Organizing Target International Nurse-In to Take Place December
28th, HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec 19, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/19/target
-nurse-in_n_1158595.html.
77. Tex. Health Code Ann. § 165.002 (1995) (allowing woman to breastfeed her child in
any location where she is authorized to be). In fact, “discreetness” is apparently a necessary
ingredient for many politicians considering statutes that create a right to breastfeed in public. See
KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 12, at 99 (describing frequent battles over whether such
statutes should require that public breastfeeding should be done “discreetly”).
78. Bonnie Rochman, FAMILY MATTERS, The Nurse-In: Why Breast-Feeding Mothers are
Mad at Target, TIME MAGAZINE (Dec. 27, 2011), http://healthland.time.com/2011/12/27/the-
nurse-in-why-breast-feeding-moms-are-mad-at-target/.
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women who nurse their children to age three or four.79 Of course, the
cover photo itself—presenting the mother in a sexy outfit and the boy in
commando-style garb (complete with black boots) and a demanding
pose—has been (appropriately) criticized for sexualizing (in a porno-
graphic way) the interaction between the mother and son pictured.80 More
to my point, comments on the Time blog following the piece repeatedly
excoriated women who breastfeed past infancy as (sexually) indulging
themselves—and even accused them of engaging in incest.81 One of the
most noteworthy quotes from the blogosphere about women breastfeeding
in public is this one: “[If] [y]ou want to pull your breasts out in a super-
market[,] I’m going [to go] all strip club on you. Might even pull out
some dirty singles and toss them at you. Supermarkets are for shopping,
strip clubs are for breasts popping out in public.”82 This quote vividly
illustrates the equation of women’s bodies with their sexuality, and of sex-
uality with women’s subordination. Public nudity (even for nursing) ap-
propriately elicits harassment, and degrading male consumption is the only
legitimate public use of breasts.
In light of these attitudes, it is interesting to note that as many as 36%
of women who forego breastfeeding do so because of lack of support from
the child’s father.83 It would be elucidating to know how often that lack of
support relates to a father’s concern with public displays of his partner’s
breasts. For example, Kedrowski and Lipscomb describe an incident in
which a man assaulted another man on a beach for “ogling” his breastfeed-
ing wife.84 One study found that 71% of men whose children are
breastfed, and 78% of those whose infants feed from bottles, believe that
public nursing is not acceptable.85 In other words, the vast majority of
fathers hold attitudes that make it extremely difficult for women to com-
bine breastfeeding and work (not to mention breastfeeding and shopping,
79. Kate Pickert, The Man Who Remade Motherhood, 179 TIME MAGAZINE 32 (May 21,
2012), available at http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2114427,00.html.
80. Id. at comments after article. (The comments to this article are no longer available
online, but the author affirms that the statements in the text about those comments are true and
correct based upon her reading of them at the time when they were available.)  Ironically, how-
ever, even breastfeeding advocates have been guilty of conflating breastfeeding with adult sexual
interactions. Consider this excerpt from Mothering magazine: “I’m in love with the little guy,
head over heels, what can I do. He can get my bra off faster than anyone I ever met, no hands at
all, just a hungry look.” KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 12, at 24 (citing Rebecca Kukla,
Ethics and Ideology in Breastfeeding Advocacy Campaigns, 21 HYPATIA 157 (2006)).
81. See Pickert, supra note 79, at comments after article. (Although the comments to this
article are no longer available online, the author affirms that they contained several statements
equating breastfeeding with self-indulgence and/or incest.)
82. Id. (Although the comments to this article are no longer available online, the author
affirms that she copied the quote in the text directly from those comments into the article.)
83. KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 12, at 36.
84. Id. at 35.
85. Id. at 37.
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going out to dinner, or any other public activity). Lest men be unfairly
blamed for low breastfeeding rates, however, it is important to note that
men are more likely to support breastfeeding in public than women.86
The idea that breastfeeding is a self-indulgent maternal practice that
inappropriately sexualizes her children—and herself, when done in pub-
lic—has generated intrusive governmental interventions into women’s
families. Children have been taken from their mothers for breastfeeding
beyond whatever age a social worker deemed appropriate.87 In one case,
“authorities connected the mother’s nursing of a two-year-old child with
her supposedly excessive sexual encounters with men (all previous to her
daughter’s birth . . . )[.]”88  Both were seen as signs of oversexualization.
Thus, the sexualization of the breast can lead inexorably—and danger-
ously—to the regulation of people with breasts—especially those who are
mothers.
Turning to the workplace, to the extent that cultural attitudes define
breastfeeding as a sexual activity that should not be done in public, they
necessarily construct it as incompatible with work. When shared (perhaps
unconsciously) by employers, such attitudes could lead to stingy accom-
modation policies that make it hard for workers to combine employment
with breastfeeding. To the extent that they have such an impact, these
attitudes will continue a long history of the sexualization of women’s bod-
ies operating to justify exclusion of them from the workplace (and the
public sphere in general)89—and harassment of  them when they’re
there.90
These cultural attitudes are also likely to influence judicial decisions
about breastfeeding under the new accommodation mandate, just as they
likely did under the previous regime. While judges may be more circum-
spect about openly expressing sexualized views than employers are, the
hostile and punitive tone of many judicial opinions in this area91 raises the
question of whether the cultural sexualization of lactation might some-
times unconsciously influence them as well.
86. Id. at 38 (citing Li Rouwei et. al., Public Beliefs and Breastfeeding Politics in Various
Settings, 104 J. AM. DIETETIC ASSN. 1162 (2004)).
87. See, e.g., HAUSMAN, supra note 20, at 81 (four-year-old child taken from her mother
because she was still nursing).
88. Id. at 83.
89. See, e.g., Suzanne E. Tallichet, Gendered Relations in the Mines and the Division of Labor
Underground, 9 GENDER & SOCIETY 697, 698-99 (1995).
90. See, e.g., Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1486, 1494 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. 1991).
91. See generally, Hébert, supra note 30, and cases discussed therein (describing cases in
detail).
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4. Negative Impact on Low-Income Women
All three of these cultural attitudes—distrust, aversion, and sexualiza-
tion—are likely to have yet more significant impacts on the treatment of
and decisions by low-income women who want to breastfeed and work.
For example, to the extent that breastfeeding is associated with under-
commitment or incompetence at work, that cultural attitude makes low-
income women (and perhaps especially African-American women) who
breastfeed particularly vulnerable to being treated with distrust. Laziness
and poor work habits are already central to the stereotyping of such
women,92 so breastfeeding will only exacerbate that effect. In addition, to
the extent that African-American women are frequently depicted in the
U.S. cultural imagination as animal-like, physically unappealing, and over-
sexed,93 the attitudes of aversion and sexualization are likely to be exagger-
ated when directed at such women as well.
Finally, the sexualization of the breast also likely makes breastfeeding
at work especially dangerous and unappealing for African-American
women. As Bernice Hausman puts it, “[B]lack women’s complex relation
to sexuality and embodied experience, mediated by hundreds of years of
negative stereotyping that connects black women’s bodies to exoticism,
animality, and service, works against their taking up a practice like
breastfeeding.”94 The bodies of such women have been treated as sexually
available to men (especially white men) ever since slavery.95 And even to-
day, such women have to deal with racial bias in rape law,96 racialized
92. See Martha L. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 DUKE L. J. 274,
283-86 (single, poor women are seen as lazy people and as irresponsible, even dangerous,
mothers); Ivy Kennelly, “That Single-Mother Element”: How White Employers Typify Black Women,
13 GENDER & SOC’Y  168, 179-85 (1999) (stating that white employers tend to associate Black
women with single-motherhood, and to assume that they lack good work ethics). Truly re-
vealing (and disturbing) is Kennelly’s finding that, even when white employers viewed their
Black female employees as hard workers (noting, for example, that they were desperate for
money), those employers still did not necessarily see such women as good workers. As one em-
ployer put it, “it is more of a need-to-work situation than it is a real true work ethic.” Id. at 182.
93. See, e.g., PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CON-
SCIOUSNESS, & THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (1999); JOANE NAGEL, RACE, ETHNICITY, &
SEXUALITY: INTIMATE INTERSECTIONS, FORBIDDEN FRONTIERS (2003); Patricia J. Williams,
My Best White Friend, THE NEW YORKER, March 4, 1996, at  94, 97.
94. HAUSMAN, supra note 20, at 44.
95. ROBERTS, supra note 18, AT 10–12 (1997).
96. Historically, there were no legal consequences for sexually assaulting enslaved Afri-
can-American women, and the view of such women as unrapeable persists to this day. Roxanne
Donovan & Michelle Williams, Living at the Intersection: The Effects of Racism and Sexism on Black
Rape Survivors, 25 WOMEN & THERAPY 95, 96-7 (2002) (reporting studies finding that college
students considering hypothetical scenarios are less likely to find that rape occurred or to hold
the perpetrator accountable when the victim is a Black woman). In making this point, I do not
mean to deny, of course, that racial bias against men of color also affects rape prosecutions today.
See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 587-88 (2009)
(discussing racial bias against men of color in rape prosecutions).
FALL 2014] Breastfeeding on a Nickel and a Dime 85
harassment in the workplace,97 and the exoticizing gaze.98 Thus, the sexu-
alization of the breast may have a particularly pernicious impact on the
experiences of African-American women who breastfeed, as well as on
their decisions about whether to do so while working.99
In summary, all three of the prevailing cultural attitudes about
breastfeeding—distrust, aversion, and sexualization—construct the prac-
tice as incompatible with working. Accordingly, breastfeeding or pumping
breast milk at work are likely to elicit negative and even hostile reactions
from employers, co-workers, and/or judges who, consciously or uncon-
sciously, see such behavior as inappropriate. Yet, as the next section re-
counts, the accommodation rights accorded women by the ACA are
somewhat limited, only generally defined, left to the discretion of the em-
ployer, and quite weakly enforced. Given the cultural attitudes described
above, and in light of those limitations in the statute, it is unlikely that the
rights the statute creates will receive the broad and flexible interpretations
necessary to assure that the women the law supposedly benefits can suc-
cessfully combine nursing and work.
B. Practical Realities: the Limited Potential of the
ACA’s Accommodation Mandate
The statutory framing of the rights created by the new federal law
will affect employers’ decisions about what accommodations to afford to
their workers, judges’ future decisions about the scope and substance of
those rights, and women’s decisions about whether to try to combine
97. On the combined effects of racial and sexual harassment on African-American
women workers, see NiCole T. Buchanan & Louise F. Fitzgerald, Effects of Racial and Sexual
Harassment on Work and the Psychological Well-Being of African American Women,13 J. OF OCCUPA-
TIONAL HEALTH PSYCH. 137 (2008).
98. See generally COLLINS, supra note 93, at 72-84 (describing stereotypes of Black
women). See also ANNE MCCLINTOCK, IMPERIAL LEATHER: RACE, GENDER AND SEXUALITY
IN THE COLONIAL CONTEXT (1995).
99. “Current stereotypes link breastfeeding to an exhibitionistic female sexuality, and his-
toric stereotypes portray black women as excessively lascivious; put together, these cultural dis-
courses make it difficult for black women to breastfeed even today, should they want to, without
risking public censure. Formula feeding emerges as a way to make the culturally perceived sexual
status of the black female body a non-issue in black mothering.” HAUSMAN, supra note 20, at 45
(citations omitted). Thus, as Hausman’s comment suggests, the sexualization of the breast can
make breastfeeding a complicated issue for African-American women (and perhaps also for other
women of color, as well as low-income white women). If such women (and/or their family and
friends) think it is either dangerous or inappropriate to breastfeed in public, then breastfeeding
becomes an especially burdensome undertaking—not only at work,  but also in other arenas of
life. Significantly limiting the woman’s physical liberty (requiring her to seek a private room
when she is, say, out to dinner, or at a party, or in a movie theatre), it thereby severely constricts
not only her work options, but her social life as well.
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work and breastfeeding.100 Cultural attitudes are likely to play a significant
role in all three of those types of decisions.
Subsection 1 shows that the new regime gives immense discretion to
employers to decide what accommodations to provide. That broad discre-
tion invites the influence of cultural factors in such decisions. Subsection 2
discusses how the ACA’s weak enforcement mechanism makes it easy for
employers to violate statutory strictures or interpret them extremely nar-
rowly, if prompted to do so by negative cultural attitudes towards lactating
employees. Each of those two sections also identifies some of the ways in
which particular attitudes towards breastfeeding might enter into the inter-
pretation of particular provisions of the law. Subsection 3 notes the dispa-
rate impact that both cultural influences and economic realities are likely
to have on decisions made by lactating employees (especially low-income
women and African-American women) under the new regime. The com-
bined message of these subsections is: It is highly likely that the accommo-
dation approach will have only a limited impact on the ability of low-
income workers to combine breastfeeding and work.
Before turning to those discussions, however, a few general com-
ments about the Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers provision
are in order.101 Because it amends the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
the statute falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor.  The
Department has not issued regulations under the law, but its Wage and
Hours Division (WHD) has provided a “fact sheet” and “frequently asked
questions” with details about how the division interprets the amend-
ment.102 The break time provision exempts workplaces under fifty em-
ployees if compliance would impose an undue hardship “by causing the
employer significant difficulty or expense when considered in relation to
the size, financial resources, nature, or structure of the employer’s busi-
ness.”103 Since it amends Section 207 of the FLSA, the provision does not
apply to employees who are exempt from overtime requirements under
Section 213 of that statute.104 Thus, the new right to accommodation will
principally affect hourly employees, not salaried workers.105 However, to
the extent that the law legitimates the idea that employers should support
100. For example, awareness of certain cultural conceptions of breastfeeding might affect
women’s comfort level in asking for accommodation.
101. For a useful overview of the accommodations required under the law, see Andrews,
supra note 1, at 128-30.
102. U.S. Wage and Hour Div., Fact Sheet #73: “Break Time for Nursing Mothers under
the FLSA,” U.S. Dept of Lab., available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/
whdfs73.pdf.
103. 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(r)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2010).
104. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b).
105. Of course, since salaried workers do not have to account for every moment of their
working day, they already have significantly more flexibility as to break time than do hourly
workers. Throughout this Article, the likely impact of the Reasonable Break Time for Nursing
Mothers law on the latter will be contrasted with predictions about whether salaried workers
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women who express milk at work, it could affect the conditions faced by
higher-paid workers as well. In fact, this Article will ultimately predict
that, going forward, salaried, especially professional, women are likely to
have a much easier time combining work and lactation than will lower-
income, hourly workers—even though the latter are the ones covered by
the new accommodation mandate.
1. Broad Employer Discretion
The relevant provision of the ACA contains two main components:
the break time requirement, which mandates that employers allow break
time for employees expressing breast milk whenever needed, and the space
requirement, which requires employers to provide a private space, other
than a toilet stall, for expressing milk.106 Both of these requirements are
governed by a reasonableness standard.107
While a reasonableness standard arguably provides the flexibility
needed to deal with the infinite number of contingencies that might arise
when it comes to pumping milk in the workplace, that broad standard has
a significant downside as well, leaving many details up to the discretion of
individual employers.108 Especially given that the government has issued
no formal regulations under the statute, common attitudes about
breastfeeding will likely have a significant impact on employer-created pol-
icies (whether official or unofficial) and, later, perhaps on judicial decisions
about the validity of those policies as well.
a. The Break Time Requirement
The ACA requires employers to provide non-exempt employees with
“reasonable break time . . . to express breast milk for [a] nursing child for
up to 1 year after the child’s birth each time such employee has need to
express the milk.”109 Under the law, employers are not required to com-
pensate employees for break time, but those employers that do provide
paid break time to their employees must allow nursing mothers to use the
with more status and bargaining power (especially professional workers) will be able to more
successfully breastfeed while working, even though they have no rights under the federal statute.
106. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1) (2010).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)-(2) (2010).
108. Because “[t]he frequency of breaks needed to express breast milk varies depending on
factors such as the age of the baby, the number of breast feedings in the baby’s normal schedule,
whether the baby is eating solid food, and other factors,” and because “the length of time neces-
sary to express milk also varies from woman to woman,” the Department of Labor concluded
that a reasonableness standard was more appropriate than a bright-line rule. Reasonable Break
Time for Nursing Mothers: Request for Information from the Public, 75 Fed. Reg. at 244(II)(b)
(Dec. 21, 2010).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(A) (2010).
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time to express milk, if so desired.110 As is discussed further below,111 both
the nature of the break provided and the fact that it is uncompensated limit
its likely utility.
The law leaves it to employers to determine both the frequency and
length of breaks provided for milk expression.112 Thus, it is ultimately up
to the employer to determine how many times the employee “has need to
express the milk.”113 While the Department of Labor has acknowledged
that “nursing mothers typically will need breaks to express milk two to
three times during an eight hour shift,”114 it does not explicitly prohibit
limiting breaks to one per day. Similarly, although the Department has
stated that “[t]he act of expressing breast milk alone typically takes about
15 to 20 minutes,”115 and that “there are many other factors” that could
enter into the time needed as well,116 it has not set forth any sort of
mandatory minimum duration for the breaks.117
Thus, based on the provisions set forth above, it appears that employ-
ers who offer as few as two fifteen minute breaks per eight-hour shift could
see themselves (and be seen by judges) as complying with the new law. Yet
that amount of time may not sufficiently address the needs of working
mothers, particularly women whose bodily processes don’t fit neatly
within the proffered “norm.”
Moreover, the very fact that such detailed factors as those listed
above118 exist illustrates the truly unique and variable nature of women’s
experiences with breast pumping—and breastfeeding, for that matter. That
variability is of course precisely what led the Department to resort to a
reasonableness standard in the first place.119 Yet it simultaneously makes
that standard problematic. The Department’s tendency to first state a mini-
mum, and then mention factors that could require exceeding that mini-
mum, suggests that employers operating under the new regime are
110. 29 U.S.C. § 207(R) (2010).
111. See infra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
112. The Department of Labor advises employers making determinations of reasonableness
to consider “both the frequency and number of breaks a nursing mother might need and the
length of time she will need to express milk.” Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers:




116. Id. Factors cited by the Department include: the time it takes to walk to the lactation
space; whether the employee has to retrieve a breast pump from another location; whether the
employee needs to unpack and set up her own pump or whether a pump is provided for her; the
efficiency of the pump used; whether there is a sink or running water nearby for the employee to
wash her hands before pumping and to clean the pump attachments when she is finished; and the
time it takes for the employee to store her milk. Id.
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 108.
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expected to make individualized assessments based on the needs of their
individual employees. Within the range of reasonableness, they are ex-
pected to provide the type of break that each woman needs.120 Thus, the
reasonable person standard requires employers to balance a wide range of
factors, some involving quite personal and intimate details about bodily
functions, in order to determine the appropriate amount of break time to
be granted. It is simply unrealistic to expect, especially given the complex
and fraught image of breastfeeding in this culture, that such discretion will
be exercised in an equitable and evenhanded way. (Consider your own
discomfort, reader, as you imagine discussing with your employer or em-
ployee the details provided in the footnotes and text presented here.)
Breast pumps, for example, vary greatly, and those variations can af-
fect the time needed for pumping.121 Similarly, physiological factors can
also affect how frequently or quickly women can pump.122 The nature of
the space made available (discussed more thoroughly below123) will also
affect the time needed. The availability of running water and soap, which
is not required by the statute,124 will also be a critical factor in determining
reasonableness of time.125 Likewise, breast milk must be stored in a cool
place until consumed.126  Reasonableness of break time may need to be
120. If that is not the Department’s intention, then the minimums stated in its regulations
are seriously deficient, for, as just discussed, they will be inadequate to meet the needs of many
breastfeeding workers.
121. Some expensive electronic pumps allow a mother to pump both breasts simultane-
ously in under ten minutes. With other, less expensive varieties, each breast must be pumped
separately. Because both sides would likely need to be pumped during each session, the time
required can easily be doubled if a less elaborate electronic model is used. Other pumps, such as
hand-powered models, are significantly more affordable but even less efficient, and thus take
more time to operate. See, e.g., MEDELA, Retail Pumps, http://www.medelabreastfeedingus
.com/products/category/retail-pumps (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
122. Some women have a large supply of milk that they are able to release quickly. Others
have a smaller supply or a slower let down, which means breast pumping will be more time
consuming for them. For some women, electronic stimulation is much less efficient than that of
their child nursing. All of these factors, of course, will dictate whether a twenty minute break is
sufficient. See LALECHE LEAGUE INTERNATIONAL, How Do I Choose A Breast Pump?, http://
www.llli.org/faq/pump.html; LALECHE LEAGUE INTERNATIONAL How Often Will I Have to
Pump When I Go Back to Work?, http://www.llli.org/faq/pumpfreq.html.
123. See infra Part II(B)(1)(b).
124. Id.
125. When pumping and storing breast milk, it is important that all parts be clean. Mothers
will have to thoroughly clean the pieces of their breast pump (there are many) either immediately
before or immediately after expressing in order to reduce the risk of harmful bacteria entering
the infant’s milk. If a mother has to walk a long distance to access water, this may render a
twenty-minute break woefully inadequate. See MEDELA, Frequently Asked Questions, at How Do I
Clean or Sanitize My Breastpump Parts?, http://www.medelabreastfeedingus.com/faqs#cleaning
—sanitizing (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
126. The Mayo Clinic, for example, states, “Freshly expressed breast milk can be kept at
room temperature for up to six hours. If you won’t use the milk that quickly or the room is
especially warm, transfer the milk to an insulated cooler, refrigerator or freezer.” How Long Does
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adjusted further if a mother doesn’t have quick, easy access to an appropri-
ate storage mechanism.
All of these judgments could, of course, be significantly affected by
an employer’s attitudes, both conscious and unconscious, towards
breastfeeding. An employer who distrusts nursing women (or working
mothers in general) might not be receptive to a particular worker’s needs,
viewing every request for additional time beyond fifteen minutes or addi-
tional amenities beyond an empty room as a sign of the employee’s self-
concern and lack of commitment to the job. An employer affected by
aversion might blanche at even discussing matters such as the washing of a
breast pump or an infant’s difficulty attaching to the breast. Finally, an
employer who unduly sexualizes the breast, and perhaps associates the sex-
ualization of women’s bodies with low-income women or women of color
in particular, might be affected by unconscious disapproval of the lactating
employee’s presence in the workplace at all.
Another area of employer discretion is worth noting as well. As pre-
viously mentioned, while an employer need not pay nursing employees for
breaks taken to express milk, one who provides compensated breaks to
other employees must allow female employees to use that break time for
expressing.127 However, any additional time that exceeds the paid break
need not be compensated.128 It is up to the employer, of course, to draw
that line and keep track of the difference, rather than just allowing the
employee to extend her paid break a bit to finish pumping—creating yet
another area in which employer discretion could be affected by cultural
attitudes.129
b. The Space Requirement
In addition to reasonable break time, the law also requires employers
to provide a reasonable space for breast pumping. Employers must provide
a place that is shielded from view, free from intrusion, and functional for
expressing milk.130 A bathroom, even if private, is not a permissible loca-
tion under the Act.131 Providing a location that is a reasonable distance
Breast Milk Keep? MAYO CLINIC.ORG, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/breast-milk-stor-
age/MY00926/NSECTIONGROUP=2. Ideally, expressed milk will be stored in an insulated
ice cooler for up to one day or in the back (not the door) of a refrigerator for up to five to eight
days. Id.
127. § U.S.C. 207(r)(2) (2010).
128. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers: Request for Information from the
Public, 75 Fed. Reg. at 244(II)(a). The Department provides an example of how this might
work: “[I]f an employer provides a 20 minute paid break and a nursing employee uses that time
to express milk and takes a total of 25 minutes for this purpose, the five minutes in excess of the
paid break time do not have to be compensated.” Id.
129. See id.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(B).
131. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers: Request for Information from the
Public, 75 Fed. Reg. at 244(IIc). An anteroom or lounge connected to a bathroom, however,
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from toilet stalls and any other bathroom areas with heavy concentrations
of bacteria will likely—but not surely—satisfy the law.
A permanent space is not required.132 A space temporarily created or
converted for expressing milk, or made available when needed by the nurs-
ing mother is sufficient—provided the space is shielded from view and free
from any intrusion from co-workers and the public.133 If the space is not
dedicated to the nursing mother’s use, it must be available when needed in
order to meet the statutory requirement, and the employer must ensure the
employee’s privacy “through means such as signs . . . or a lock on the
door.”134
In leaving it up to the employer whether to provide anything more
than a partitioned space, this interpretation makes it highly likely that some
employers will merely provide curtains or dividers, through which breast
pumping could easily be heard by other workers. Such spaces might prove
embarrassing to lactating women and could also facilitate—or even in-
vite—harassment by co-workers or supervisors.
And the possibility of harassment is unfortunately very real. For ex-
ample, in Delima v. Home Depot,135 Nancy Delima’s male supervisor had
arranged for her to take breaks in a training room in order to express milk
for her baby.136 On several occasions, Delima’s supervisor used the store’s
intercom page system to inform other employees to report to the training
room while Delima was expressing milk.137 He also often rattled the door
while Delima was in the training room.138 In addition, along with co-
workers, he made comments about “bringing cereal for the pumped milk
that [Delima] stored in the manager’s refrigerator.”139 One male superior
told Delima that he was frustrated by “women and all their issues.”140
“may be sufficient” under the law. Id. A locker room, too, may be acceptable if there is “suffi-
cient differentiation between the toilet area and the space reserved for expressing breast milk[.]”
Id.
132. Id. If providing a separate room is impracticable, “the requirement can be met by
creating a space with partitions or curtains.” Id.
133. WHD Fact Sheet, supra note 104.  The Department’s preliminary interpretation of
the requirement that the space be shielded from view and free from intrusion “is that it requires
employers where practicable to make a room (either private or with partitions for use by multiple
nursing employees) available for use by employees taking breaks to express milk.” Reasonable
Break Time for Nursing Mothers, 75 Fed. Reg. at 24II)(c).
134. Id.
135. 616 F. Supp.2d 1055 (D. Or. 2008).
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Nothing in the new statute gives employees a right to be protected
from this sort of harassment141 and the statute’s minimal privacy require-
ments make such mistreatment quite possible. Cultural attitudes of aver-
sion and sexualization, in particular, are likely to elicit harassment: Co-
workers may express their discomfort with what they consider inappropri-
ate breastfeeding (or pumping) by humiliating the person engaging in it;
employers and/or co-workers might even view the nursing mother as de-
serving of harassment due to a perceived inappropriate expression of sexu-
ality at work. In sum, the combined effect of distrust, aversion, and
sexualization will likely be accommodation that provides minimal privacy,
increased harassment due to that vulnerability, and employer ambivalence
regarding the prevention of that harassment.
While partitioned spaces that invite harassment are allowed under the
statute, the new law does require that the location provided for lactating
mothers be “functional” as a space for expressing breast milk.142 In order
to be a functional space, “at a minimum, a space must contain a place for
the nursing mother to sit, [and] a flat surface, other than the floor, on
which to place the pump.”143 However, neither a sink for washing hands
and pump attachments nor a place to store the breast milk is required
under the law.144
Once again, such statutory gaps leave employees at the mercy of their
employers. As discussed above, distrust could cause employers to resist giv-
ing their employees reasonable breaks, suitable rooms, and much-needed
amenities like sinks and cool storage options. Employers may perceive such
offerings as being “too expensive” for workers who they believe will con-
tribute very little while breastfeeding (or even while parenting). Moreover,
to the extent that certain women’s race and class status already cause em-
ployers to see them as unreliable workers, this dynamic will only be
exacerbated.145
141. Harassment based on lactation is probably not uncommon in U.S. workplaces, and, of
course, in some circumstances this sort of harassment could be actionable under Title VII, or
relevant state laws. While I was unable to find specific data about the incidence of lactation
harassment, pregnancy-related discrimination (which would include lactation discrimination) is
on the increase. Orozco, supra note 4 at 1290-91, (“It surpasses the percentage increases in both
sexual harassment and sex discrimination claims. Over the last ten years, charges of pregnancy
discrimination filed with the EEOC and fair employment practices agencies (FEPAs) have in-
creased over 48%.”). Indicative of the prevalence of breastfeeding-related harassment and/or mis-
treatment is the fact that, as of 2010, six states and the District of Columbia  had laws explicitly
prohibiting discrimination against lactating women. Id. at 1297.
142. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers: Request for Information from the
Public, 75 Fed. Reg. 244, 80076 (Dec. 21, (2010).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. As the Department has noted, non-office work settings, such as retail stores, restau-
rants, and construction sites, may make it more challenging for employers to comply with the
law. Id. at 80076. In its Request for Information, the Department asked the public for comments
regarding the adequacy of spaces designated for other purposes, including managers’ offices,
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c. Effects of Broad Discretion
It is worth noting that, at every step in the process where the em-
ployer is granted wide discretion, low-income women and African-Amer-
ican women (as well as perhaps other women of color) are likely to be
disproportionately disadvantaged—both by cultural attitudes likely to af-
fect the exercise of that discretion and by the material realities of their lives.
Hourly workers are likely to have little (if any) bargaining power (to urge
employers towards more expansive accommodations) and stingy employer
policies that place more burdens on the woman herself could strain a low-
income worker’s already strapped budget.
For example, such women may feel that they cannot afford to take
the income reduction (easily around 7.5 hours a week) that the statute
allows for time spent expressing breast milk for a child.146 The Department
does “strongly encourage[ ]” employers to allow employees to extend the
work day to make up for unpaid break time, but they are not required to
do so.147 Once again, the amount of accommodation provided will be a
direct function of not only the employer’s attitudes but also the bargaining
power of the employee—and both of those are likely to negatively impact
these women.
In many ways, the entire scheme set up by the ACA is premised upon
denial of these issues. That scheme explicitly assumes the need for negotia-
tion between employer and employee and implicitly assumes that such an
approach makes sense in low-paying, highly hierarchized workplaces. The
Department trusts candid discussion will “help employers and employees
to develop shared expectations . . . .”148 “A simple conversation” between
the lactating employee and a supervisor or human resources representative,
the Department asserts, “would facilitate an employer’s ability to make
arrangements to comply with the law before the nursing mother returns to
work.”149
Yet, especially given widespread popular attitudes about breastfeed-
ing, that statement, and the employer-discretion-based accommodation
mandate of the ACA, are surely unrealistic. As noted throughout this dis-
storage spaces, and utility closets. Id. The Department also asked for “creative solutions” that
address break time for nursing mothers who work in non-fixed places, such as bus drivers, law
enforcement officers, emergency medical technicians, and postal workers. Id.
146. Since a woman should ideally pump with the same frequency as she would have
nursed her child, LALECHE LEAGUE INTERNATIONAL, How Often Will I Have to Pump When I Go
Back to Work?, http://www.lalecheleague.org/faq/pumpfreq.html, a full-time employee working
forty hours a week could lose as much as ninety minutes per day, or 7.5 hours per week of pay.
(Calculations here are based on a mother with a twelve-week-old baby who nurses every three
hours for thirty minutes at a time, which is not uncommon for this age.)
147. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers: Request for Information from the
Public, 75 Fed. Reg. at 244(II)(a) (Dec. 21, 2010).
148. Id. at 244(II)(b)(vi).
149. Id. at (II)(d).
94 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 20:65
cussion, the hypersexualization of the breast, as well as the image of
breastfeeding as distasteful, if not disturbing, are highly likely to affect how
some (if not many) employers exercise their discretion in administering the
law. Employers who distrust their employees or have aversive reactions to
lactation might be hesitant to offer ample, or even adequate, break times
for nursing mothers—or, alternatively, they might forego the conversation
entirely. These exercises of discretion will have a disparately negative im-
pact on low-income workers, perhaps especially African-American
women.
It is important to note as well that the topic of breastfeeding causes
embarrassment for both men and women. Thus, as is treated more fully
below,150 employees themselves may be hesitant to discuss the issue—espe-
cially in a work environment where employer attitudes cause them con-
cern about hostility or sexual harassment. Moreover, employer hyper-
anxiety about harassment liability—for example, hyper-vigilance about dis-
cussions of physical appearance or body parts of any kind—could, ironi-
cally, make supervisors even more loathe to discuss breastfeeding than they
otherwise might be.
An emphasis on negotiation between the parties is especially prob-
lematic given that the law does not explicitly require employers to have a
written policy explaining employees’ rights. A written policy would pro-
vide much more information to the employee without requiring an in-
person conversation with her employer, and would thereby give her fuller
and more accurate information about the parameters of the accommoda-
tion being provided. It would also decrease the amount of discussion
needed about (potentially uncomfortable) details. Of course, as is discussed
further below, she would still have no guarantee that the employer would
follow that policy—or that the policy would be appropriate to her
needs.151
2. Weak Enforcement Mechanism
The Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has
been charged with enforcing the ACA’s new break time provisions.152
WHD investigators determine compliance with the law by conducting in-
terviews and gathering data on wages, hours, and other employment con-
ditions.153 If they determine that a violation has occurred, the WHD
150. See infra Part II(B)(2).
151. On the limited remedies available under the statute, see infra, at Part II(B)(2).
152. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers: Request for Information from the
Public, 75 Fed. Reg. at 244(II)(g). Enforcement of the new law will be based on statutory
language and the guidance provided in WHD Fact Sheet #73 and its accompanying FAQ page.
Id. at 244. An employee who believes her employer has violated the new law may call a toll-free
WHD phone number. Id. at 244(II)(g). From here, she will be directed to the nearest WHD
office. Basic information about how to file a complaint is also available on the WHD website. Id.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 211.
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might “recommend changes in employment practices to bring an em-
ployer into compliance.”154 That is the extent of the WHD’s power.
Thus, in terms of individual claims, while the new statute’s “enforce-
ment landscape is still developing,”155 it seems unlikely to provide robust
remedies for employer failure to comply with its requirements. The statute
does not specifically mention an individual cause of action, and at least one
district court has held that it does not provide one.156 In Salz v. Casey’s
Marketing Co.,157 the plaintiff complained after discovering a working
video camera in the room her employer had provided for her to pump.158
After the employer declined to remove the camera (suggesting that she
cover it instead with a plastic bag), and subsequently reprimanded her for
alleged job-performance inadequacies, she quit her job and subsequently
sued.159 The district court for the Northern District of Iowa held that the
new law did not create an individual cause of action for damages caused by
denial of breastfeeding break time required under its provisions.160 The
court explained:
Since Section 207(r)(2) provides that employers are not required
to compensate employees for time spent express milking, and
Section 216(b) provides that enforcement of Section 207 is lim-
ited to unpaid wages, there does not appear to be a manner of
enforcing the express breast milk provisions. A recent notice
from the Department of Labor corroborates Defendant’s inter-
pretation and limits an employee to filing claims directly with
the Department of Labor. The Department of Labor may then
“seek injunctive relief in federal district court . . . .”161
However, the Salz court did allow the plaintiff to go forward with a claim
for retaliation and constructive discharge, noting that, “once an employer
discriminates or discharges an employee in relation to an employee’s com-
plaint about the employer’s express breastfeeding policy, they have violated
not only Section 207(r) [the nursing break provision] but also Section
154. Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers: Request for Information from the
Public, 75 Fed. Reg. at 244(II)(g). In recommending such changes, “[t]o the extent possible,”
the WHD will give violations of the break time and place provision priority consideration in
order to allow expeditious resolution of the problem while preserving the employee’s ability to
continue breastfeeding. Id.
155. Andrews, supra note 1, at 137.
156. Salz v. Casey’s Marketing Co., No. 11-CV-3055-DEO, 2012 WL 2952998 (N.D.
Iowa July 19, 2012).
157. Id. at *2-3.
158. Id. at *1.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
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215(a)(3) [the retaliation provision].”162 Under this interpretation, since
remedies under the retaliation section of the FLSA include reinstatement
and liquidated damages (among others), retaliation claims have the most
potential for providing recourse to employees.163  But of course, not all
employers will retaliate when they receive complaints about inadequate
accommodation.
Thus, many employees may be left only with the option of asking the
Department of Labor to seek an injunction against the offending employer
behavior. (The FLSA also authorizes a minimal penalty of $1,000 per vio-
lation.164) It seems unlikely, however, that injunctive relief will adequately
assist nursing mothers. Even though an injunction is of course available on
an expedited basis, the process is still unlikely to be quick enough.165 Thus,
the only meaningful relief will be reinstatement of lost wages for employ-
ees who are actually terminated. With such limited remedies available for
individual plaintiffs, the fear of repercussions for offending employers is
minimal. Employers could provide stingy and impracticable accommoda-
tions, or even fail to provide any accommodation at all, with little fear of
consequences.
In short, the new statute provides a right with potentially no remedy.
If other courts follow Salz, disinterested or hostile employers will have
little incentive to comply with its provisions, and will have every reason to
interpret the law in ungenerous, if not outright hostile, ways.
3. Factors Affecting Workers’ Decisions
Workers deciding whether to try to combine work and breastfeeding
are likely to be influenced by both cultural and economic factors: First, to
the extent that they are aware of breastfeeding attitudes that could influ-
ence their employers, they might hesitate even to try to negotiate an ac-
commodation. Second, the economic realities they face could affect their
assessment of the pros and cons of pumping breast milk at work.
Cultural biases about breastfeeding could deter low-income women,
perhaps especially African-American women, from asking for accommo-
dation for lactation. As noted above,166 all three of the cultural attitudes
162. Id. at *4.
163. Id. at *3 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 217).
164. Fair Labor Standards Act Advisor, Dep’t. of Labor, Enforcement under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, available at http://www.dol.gov/elaws/esa/flsa/screen74.asp.
165. Due to the extremely time-sensitive nature of breastfeeding and the physiological pro-
duction of breast milk, failure to ensure quick resolution could result in a mother’s milk drying
up and the cessation of breastfeeding (and/or, possibly, employment). See generally, Steven E.J.
Daly and Peter E. Hartmann, Infant Demand and Milk Supply 11 J.HUM. LACT 21, 21 (1995)
(concluding that “human milk production is at least in part controlled by the infant’s appetite,”
thereby showing that inability to pump or nurse while at work would likely affect ability to
produce milk). Hence, injunctive relief is more likely to help future mothers in the particular
workplace than the particular woman who is currently affected by an employer’s noncompliance.
166. See supra Part II(A).
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revealed by the psychological literature on breastfeeding are likely to have a
disparately negative impact on those women. A low-income worker, espe-
cially if she is Black, might fear that pumping at work will exacerbate al-
ready-present employer distrust of her reliability. Or, given how much she
needs her income, she might just prefer not to take the risk of her em-
ployer reacting negatively. She might worry that breastfeeding or pumping
could elicit harassing behavior from supervisors or co-workers affected by
aversion and/or sexualization.167 Or she could simply feel uncomfortable
discussing breastfeeding with her employer or drawing attention to her
breasts, especially in an extremely hierarchical and/or predominately white
workplace. Thus, such women’s general awareness of prevailing cultural
attitudes about breastfeeding (and about women in their socioeconomic
and racialized groups) might combine with the negotiation-focused ac-
commodation system set up by the new statute to cause them to forego
breastfeeding altogether—as many of them do now.
If such a woman does decide to seek accommodation, the limited
protections provided by the statute, as well as the potential for courts and
employers to narrowly interpret it, could also have an especially negative
economic impact on her options. As noted above,168 especially for someone
not earning a living wage, having one’s pay docked for breastfeeding or
milk pumping breaks is not an insignificant financial burden, nor are the
costs of obtaining all the materials necessary to pump.169 Such a woman
may even find that the extra costs of obtaining an efficient breast pump
present a formidable barrier.170 When such financial burdens are exacer-
bated by stingy employer accommodation policies (made possible by low-
wage workers’ limited bargaining power), they might simply make
breastfeeding not worth the effort. Further, if combining work and
breastfeeding doesn’t seem to be a viable option for such women, they are
likely to forego breastfeeding for work.171 Researcher Judith Galtry reports
that:
167. Author Bernice Hausman describes an exchange she had with prominent African-
American theorist Patricia Hill Collins, in which Collins “suggested that by breastfeeding in a
work setting, black women would risk representing themselves as sexual, which they could ill
afford to do.” HAUSMAN, supra note 20, at 45. Such a “strategy of respectability” is a “continuing
political necessity” for Black women, to “combat racist employment discrimination.” Id.
168. See supra Part II(B)(1).
169. For a discussion of the role that material barriers play in women’s decisions not to
breastfeed, see HAUSMAN, supra note 20, at 89–90.
170. Health insurers frequently provide only enough money for employees to buy the
cheap, manual pumps—machines that are much slower and virtually useless in a work setting.
Since a fast, reliable pump can cost nearly $250, the cost of buying a pump might itself make
breastfeeding difficult for a low-wage worker to afford. See Breast Pumps: Reviews, Consumer-
Search, http://www.consumersearch.com/breast-pumps (last updated Feb. 2013).
171. While the reasons for differential rates of breastfeeding among different groups of
women are complex and not completely understood, it is likely that the need to work prevents
some women from breastfeeding. See Office of the Surgeon General, Office on Women’s
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Low-income women, among whom African-American and
Hispanic women are over-represented, . . . comprise the group
most likely not to take [maternity] leave and to return to paid
work soon after childbirth, as well as to work longer hours be-
cause of economic necessity. The economic imperative to re-
turn to paid employment in the early postpartum period is
linked to both the low earnings of the women themselves and
the high levels of male unemployment and underemployment
in their communities.172
In contrast, the relatively strong bargaining power exercised by eco-
nomically privileged women might enable them to negotiate generous in-
terpretations (or even expansions) of the ACA accommodations with their
employers, even though they are not covered by the statute. The norma-
tive standard set by the Reasonable Break Time for Nursing Mothers pro-
vision is likely to further augment these women’s ability to obtain
accommodations. (Imagine a lawyer saying to her managing partner, “Do
you mean I get less accommodation than my assistant?”173)  Moreover,
such women’s economic security is likely to make it more possible for
them to choose to stay home while nursing, if they prefer—or if the reali-
ties of the workplace make combining work and lactation unrealistic.174 As
Galbry reports,
[W]omen with higher educational qualifications, higher-status
occupations, and higher incomes, who return to work [after
childbirth] to further their careers, are more likely to take leave
Health, THE SURGEON GENERAL’S CALL TO ACTION TO SUPPORT BREASTFEEDING, BARRI-
ERS TO BREASTFEEDING IN THE UNITED STATES, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/
NBK52688/ (“Employed mothers typically find that returning to work is a significant barrier to
breastfeeding. Women often face inflexibility[,] . . . a lack of privacy for breastfeeding[,] . . . are
unable to find child care facilities[,] . . . face fears over job insecurity, and have limited maternity
leave benefits . . . . One of the biggest barriers to continuation of breastfeeding for women is the
need to return to work.”); see also Ogbuanu et. al, Balancing Work and Family: Effects of Employ-
ment Characteristics on Breastfeeding, 27 J. HUM. LACTATION 225, 225 (2011) (“Work-related is-
sues have been cited as a major reason for noninitiation and early cessation of breastfeeding.”);
Cf. Dep’t. of Fair Emp’t & Housing v. Acosta Tacos, No. E-200708 T-0097-00se, 2009 WL
2595487 (Cal. Fair Emp’t and Hous. Comm’n) (June 19, 2009) (plaintiff who was told she could
return to work after she finished nursing her child did not breast feed because she couldn’t afford
to be unemployed), discussed in Hébert, supra note 32, at 121.
172. Judith Galbry, Lactation and the Labor Market: Breastfeeding, Labor Market Changes, and
Public Policy in the United States, 18 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 467, 471-72 (1997)
(citations omitted).
173. It seems to this author that, rightly or wrongly, many lawyers would likely believe that
they deserve benefits equal to or better than those awarded less highly paid employees in their
workplaces.
174. “Studies of employed women find that those with the most professional autonomy are
best able to balance the competing needs of breastfeeding and outside employment.” KEDROW-
SKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 12, at 71.
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around the birth of a child. There are various reasons for this:
These women are more likely to fit the eligibility for statutory
leave; to have greater negotiating power with employers; and
also to have higher-income partners who can support them.
Therefore, this group is more likely to have greater choice as to
whether they breast-feed and for what length of time.175
Thus, as compared with low-income, hourly wage workers, these
economically privileged (disproportionately white) employees are less
likely to face very limited accommodation regimes176 and more likely to
be able to combine breastfeeding with work if they so desire. Given these
likely dynamics, the ACA could ultimately actually exacerbate the class-
and race-based differences that have existed under the Title VII/PDA re-
gime,177 leading to a system where professional employees receive more
accommodation than ever before, and working class and low-income
workplaces remain sites of harassment and resistance to breastfeeding, all
the while that they claim formal compliance with the law.
Thus, the combined effect of marginalized women’s economic vul-
nerability and the cultural biases they may face under the new law could be
to produce a full-fledged, two-tiered system, wherein such women (as
compared to privileged women) are both less able to combine work and
breastfeeding and less able to nurse without working (if they so desire).178 As
the next Part discusses, this two-tiered system replicates a longstanding
structural feature of the U.S. economy, which has historically assigned
low-wage work to women of color and poor white women, often without
regard for the wellbeing of their children.
175. Galbry, supra note 172, at 472 (citations omitted).  Assumedly, the point about “statu-
tory leave” in the quote refers to state statutes.
176. See Jodi Kantor, On the Job, Nursing Mothers Are Finding a 2-Class System, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 1, 2006, at A1. (describing programs providing “free or subsidized breast pumps, access to
lactation consultants, and special rooms with  telephones and Internet connections for employees
who want to work as they pump . . .”).
177. See generally id., (noting that “wealthier women can spend their way out of work-
versus-pumping dilemmas, overnighting milk home from business trips and buying $300 pumps
that extract milk quickly. . .”).
178. Breastfeeding rates do tend to relate inversely to workforce participation. In 2007,
80.6% of Latinas, 77.7% of whites, and 59.7% of Blacks reported ever having breastfed. The
numbers for those still breastfeeding at six months were, respectively, 46.0%, 45.1%, and 27.9%.
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Provisional Breastfeeding Rates by Socio-demo-
graphic Factors, Among Children Born in 2007, available at http://www.cdc.gov/breastfeeding/data/
NIS_data/2007/socio-demographic_any.html (The CDC material doesn’t clearly indicate how
Latinas of African or European ancestry are counted.) Correspondingly, “African-American
mothers of infants have higher rates of labor force participation (66%) than their non-Hispanic
white (57%), Latina (45%) and Asian/Pacific Islander (56%) sisters . . .”). As has been noted,
those differentials “may explain their lower rates of breastfeeding, especially if they are not in
professional positions with considerable autonomy.” KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 12, at
17.
100 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 20:65
III. THE ACA, ECONOMIC ROLES, AND STRUCTURAL BIAS
[The Public Health Service’s strategy] fails to examine or address the
reason for [the] gap between message and behavior, insistently keeping
the focus on changing women’s choices, and insistently maintaining the
background assumption that these choices are best treated as the prod-
ucts of isolated free wills that can be understood and manipulated in
abstraction from the social and material conditions that constrain, posi-
tion, and shape them. – Rebecca Kukla179
Part II predicted that prevailing cultural biases, the ACA’s negotia-
tion-focused and toothless accommodation scheme, and low-income
women’s limited economic resources may combine together to discourage
such women from deciding to breastfeed while continuing to work. Im-
plicit in that prediction is the recognition that such women’s decisions are
complex, significantly constrained social acts that can’t be reduced to per-
sonal “choices.”
The contextualized understanding of women’s decisions presented in
this Article sheds new light on current data about breastfeeding rates,
which vary significantly by race and class status.180 Poor, less-educated, and
nonwhite women breastfeed less than their wealthier, more educated,
white counterparts.181  That disparity is frequently attributed to the al-
leged ignorance and/or laziness of low-income women and women of
color. Consider, for example, this blog comment: “Not only are lower
income women not given the education to breastfeed, they are also handed
out formula. It is much easier to take the formula than to figure out how
to breastfeed, especially if you are not aware of the benefits. It is really
tragic.”182 This comment, while obviously intended to be sympathetic,
nevertheless fails to mention important potential economic and cultural
influences on low-income women’s decisions about breastfeeding. In so
doing, it subtly (though surely not intentionally) reinforces the notion that
179. Rebecca Kukla, Ethics and Ideology in Breastfeeding Advocacy Campaigns, 21 HYPATIA
157, 162 (2006).
180. See infra, note 181.
181. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Although U.S.
breastfeeding rates are increasing, rates remain relatively low among some groups of women,
particularly young women, black women, women at or below the federal poverty level, and
women with less than a college education.” CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVEN-
TION, The Importance of Breastfeeding, available at http://www.cdc.gov/prams/breastfeeding.htm.
According to CDC data from 2008, 58.9% of Black infants had ever breastfed, compared to
75.2% of white infants. Progress in Increasing Breastfeeding and Reducing Racial/Ethnic Differences –
United States, 2000-2008 Births, 62 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report (Feb 8, 2013), availa-
ble at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/wk/mm6205.pdf.
182. Natural Parenting, Who Breast Feeds?, MOTHERWEAR BREASTFEEDING BLOG, at
comments (Oct. 9, 2007, 11:55 AM), http://breastfeeding.blog.motherwear.com/2007/01/
who_breastfeeds.html (comment submitted by username “Natural Parenting”).
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such women’s behavior is due to their ignorance (due to lack of “educa-
tion”) and perhaps even their laziness (taking the easy road of bottle feed-
ing rather than bothering to find out the benefits of breastfeeding). Yet the
discussion of incentive effects above suggests that such women’s behavior is
perhaps better understood as the product of rational and accurate assess-
ments of the pros and cons of combining breastfeeding and work. Given
the risks, challenges, and limited benefits of trying to pump milk while
working, many such women might reasonably conclude that it is best for
themselves and their families to forego nursing—even if they are con-
vinced that breast milk is the ideal source of nutrition for an infant.
This Part thus starts from the premise that low-income women’s de-
cisions to forego breastfeeding should be understood not as freely willed
“poor” choices by individuals, but rather as rational decisions made within
a severely constricted universe of options. Seeing such women’s decisions
as rational, rather than ill-informed or lazy, prompts one to look for the
structural inequalities that constrain and produce them. The discussion in
Part II can be understood as such an inquiry.183 This Part extends that
inquiry by looking not at the behavioral incentives created by existing so-
cial and legal regimes, but instead at the economic roles, and relationships
to work, that are (re)produced by those regimes—as well as the stereotypes
that legitimate those relationships. There are historical parallels, I argue, to
the work-role inequalities a two-tiered system of breastfeeding is likely to
replicate and legitimate.
More explicitly, this Part argues that the two-tiered system of
breastfeeding access predicted above would reinforce longstanding work
roles for low-income women and women of color, as well as the stereo-
types that reinforce them. In addition, the lower breastfeeding rates for
low-income women that are necessitated by such work roles are likely to
be characterized as the result of women’s personal “choices,” rather than as
evidence of systemic race and class inequality. In turn, that individualist
understanding of low-income women’s behavior will reinforce prevailing
stereotypes of such women—as both “bad” mothers and “bad” workers.
Section A of this Part describes two economic roles to which low-
income women and economically privileged women, respectively, have
historically been relegated—roles that will likely be untouched, and possi-
bly reinforced, by the turn to accommodation. Section B discusses how
the new breastfeeding law could contribute to already-extant class and race
inequalities among working mothers, as well as reinforce the blame-the-
victim discourse that has traditionally legitimated those inequalities. Put
differently, that section discusses how the stereotypes of low-income
women and African-American women that have historically justified this
183. As the reader will recall, the discussion in Part II shows how limited statutory protec-
tions and remedies, especially when operating in a world of complicated cultural attitudes to-
wards breastfeeding and the women who do it, impose systemic constraints on women’s choices
about breastfeeding and work.
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status-based employment regime are likely to legitimate a two-tiered
breastfeeding regime with parallel effects.
A. Women’s Roles in Relation to Work: Historical Practices
and the Stereotypes Legitimating Them
A new dimension of the breastfeeding-at-work issue is revealed when
one examines the historical structuring of the capitalist workplace, and the
roles of different women workers within it. Against that backdrop, the
ACA accommodation regime, especially if it results in the two-tiered ac-
cess predicted here, looks less like a transformation and more like the con-
tinuation of an unequal work structure that has been foundational to the
capitalist system in the United States.
It is commonplace for scholars writing about women and work to
note that “women” used to be seen as “natural” mothers and inappropriate
workers whose place was in the home, and that Title VII and other legal
reforms were designed to eliminate the effects of this “separate spheres”
ideology.184 But that statement might be only partially accurate. After all,
some women have always been seen as appropriate workers—and in fact
have been punished and derogated if they tried to stay home.185 Those
women have watched as legal reforms have opened high-paying jobs to
white, economically privileged women, at the same time that their own
financial dependence on inflexible and low-paying work has continued to
make it extremely difficult for them to protect and care for their chil-
dren.186 In short, privileged women have been able to add the role of
worker to their traditional role as mother,187 but low-income women (dis-
proportionately African-American women) have not been able to add the
role of stay-at-home mother to their traditional role as worker.  They con-
tinue to have to negotiate workplaces that place little value on their do-
mestic roles or the welfare of their children.
184. See, e.g., Laura A. Rosenbury, Work Wives, 36 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 345, 346, 356-
57 (2013); Harvard Law Review, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (1986) (“The nineteenth amendment, title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 1971 case Reed v. Reed represent legal signposts on the
road to full disintegration of the separate spheres ideology.”).
185. See discussion, infra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
186. Cf. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 58, at 150, (“[The full-commodifi-
cation [model’s] vision of the market as a benign force that can enhance family life is one most
often held by women with enough wealth to gain access to rewarding work and quality child
care.”).
187. Not that privileged women don’t also continue to face anti-mother bias at work, of
course. For example, in the practice of law, “Motherhood results in a wage penalty for women
that remains unaccounted for even after elaborate controls for work experience.” Ronit Di-
novitzer, Nancy Reichman, and Joyce Sterling, The Differential Valuation of Women’s Work: A
New Look at the Gender Gap in Lawyers’ Incomes, 88 SOCIAL FORCES 819 (2009).
FALL 2014] Breastfeeding on a Nickel and a Dime 103
This Part discusses the two different roles that have historically been
assigned to those two (broadly defined) groups of women.188 The first,
which I will call the “domestic” role, is the familiar “stay-at-home mom”
status that has been assigned to white, economically privileged women
since the “separate spheres” era of the 19th century, if not before.189 That
status is characterized by the prescription of motherhood as the appropri-
ate role of such women (today, sometimes along with professional work)
and is legitimated by stereotypes of them as innately domestic and nurtur-
ing. The domestic mother role traditionally relegates such women to a life
characterized by (at least periodic) economic dependency and relative190
economic powerlessness (both in relationships and in the post-childbirth
job market). Although widely criticized since the mid-twentieth cen-
tury,191 this ideology still serves to justify sex-based wage differentials, en-
trenched glass ceilings in professional workplaces, and unequal distribution
of domestic labor in the home.192
Of more central importance for this Article, however, is the second
role to which certain women have been historically relegated—which I
call the “colonized” role.193  That role involves the exploitative use of
those women’s labor for economic profit, often at the expense of their
families.194  Feminists like myself often say that the workplace is structured
around a “male” model that didn’t change to accommodate women when
they entered the economic sphere. But I’m increasingly of the mind that
when we talk about blue color workers, the working poor, etc.—groups
that are disproportionately women of color, but also include many
whites—we have to acknowledge that this statement is not accurate. After
all, those groups have been in the workplace for a long time. It might not
188. Of course, there are variations within each group—especially, for example, race-based
variations among low-income women. While my focus here will be on low-income white
women and low-income African-American women, that is not to deny that many of the dynam-
ics I describe may apply, to a greater or lesser degree, to other low-income women of color as
well.
189. See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 58, at 31.
190. By “relative,” I mean in comparison to if she had stayed in the work world and not
taken time off to have and parent a child.
191. See, e.g., Betty Friedan, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE, chapter 4 (1963).
192. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 58, at 69–72 (discussing hostility that
working mothers experience in the workplace).
193. I use the “colonize” root advisedly. In my opinion, the exploitative and appropriative
economic relationships experienced by this group, as well as the pejorative, “othering” stereo-
types that hide and legitimate that subordination, should be understood as parallel (but decidedly
not identical) to the exploitation and Orientalizing that characterized colonial powers’ relations
with colonized peoples—in short, as a form of what might be called “domestic colonialism.” For
a different, but complementary, take on the notion of domestic colonialism, see NATSU SAITO,
SETTLER COLONIALISM & RACE IN AMERICA (forthcoming) (book draft on file with the
author).
194. Since this is often the less familiar role, I’ll describe it in more detail.
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be too far of a stretch, in fact, to suggest that the modern industrialized
workplace was actually designed with them in mind—that it is explicitly
structured to appropriate the labor of such women (and their male coun-
terparts) as much and as cheaply as possible, without regard to the impact
on their families and without concern for their role (or rights) as mothers
(or, of course, fathers).195 In that sense, the modern workplace is not so
much a “male” workplace, as an exploitative one—if you will, a harshly
capitalist one. Perhaps it is even appropriate to call it colonialist.
From at least as early as 1900, the United States’ capitalist economy
has relegated certain groups of women to routine, menial, often-repetitive
work at low pay.196 (This has happened to men as well,197 but my focus
here is on women.) Such employment has often involved—and continues
to involve today—working long hours in highly regulated workplaces, as
expendable employees who have very little power, and for wages that often
consign fulltime workers to lives of poverty.198 Of course, in the early
stages of capitalism, many female industrial workers had to bring their chil-
dren with them into dangerous workplaces or leave them home unat-
tended.199 And while child labor laws prevent most such abuses today,200
195. For example, the notoriously exploitative garment industry in the United States was
one of the first industries to employ women. On that industry’s deployment of disparaging
stereotypes to naturalize the relegation of women workers to low-paying jobs involving spinning,
weaving, and sewing, see ELLEN ISRAEL ROSEN, MAKING SWEATSHOPS: THE GLOBALIZATION
OF THE U.S. APPAREL INDUSTRY 24 (2002) (“The segregation of women in low-wage industrial
production has traditionally been legitimated by defining the work women do as rooted in their
biological, anatomical, and psychological ‘nature’—for example, their small hands [and] their
lesser intelligence, which presumably makes them unable to master more complex industrial
work skills.”).
196. The presence of (low-income) women in U.S. labor markets increased significantly
after 1900, DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 21(1980) (in 1920 Chicago,
“20.4 percent of the wives of semiskilled and unskilled men were working”).  They worked
especially in clerical and domestic jobs, but also (by the 1930s) in certain industries (for example,
automobiles (7% of the workers) and electrical (25% of the workers), as well as canning, textiles,






197. See generally, BRODY, supra note 196 (examining history of industrial labor organiza-
tion in 20th century).
198. For example, during the 1930s, women’s average annual wages were approximately
half those of men ($525 versus $1027). THE GALE GROUP, supra note 196.  Once the Depression
hit, women’s wages dropped, “so that many working women could not meet basic expenses.” Id.
199. JOYCE BURNETTE, GENDER, WORK AND WAGES IN INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION
BRITAIN 176-77 (2008).
200. See U.S. Wage & Hour Div., Child Labor Provisions for Nonagricultural Occupations under
the Fair Labor Standards Act, http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/childlabor101.pdf (last visited
Mar. 19, 2014). But see Steve Rosen, Time to Rethink Child Labor Laws, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 30,
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migrant farm workers continue to have to bring their children to the fields
and blue collar workers often find themselves having to leave their children
at home unattended, send them to school sick, arrange and rearrange child
care as daily circumstances change, and the like—all because to do other-
wise could cost them their jobs.201
In short, the work available to economically marginalized women
often requires them to face (and, not uncommonly, engage in Herculean
efforts to overcome) serious barriers to their children’s well-being in order
to ensure their families’ economic survival. Economic arrangements under
capitalism provide tidy profits to employers of such women, at the expense
of those women’s families. This exploitative relationship is arguably even
more entrenched today than it was a few decades ago, with technology
facilitating worker surveillance, the minimum wage currently worth much
less in real dollars than it was a half-century ago,202 and executive compen-
sation exploding while worker wages stagnate.203
This exploitative consignment of certain women to menial, low-pay-
ing jobs has been obscured and legitimated by class and race stereotypes
2013), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/yourmoney/sns-201201301830—tms—
kidmoneyctnsr-a20120130-20120130,0,6724003.story (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (discussing
push to relax child labor laws in states such as Maine and Wisconsin); Peggy Lowe, Labor Depart-
ment Revising Child Labor Plan, HARVEST PUBLIC MEDIA (Feb. 1, 2012), http://harvestpub-
licmedia.org/article/998/labor-department-revising-child-labor-plan/5 (discussing relaxation of
child labor laws in agriculture) (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
201. Jodi Kantor, As Shifts Vary, Family’s Only Constant is Chaos, NEW YORK TIMES, Aug.
14, 2014, at A1 (describing how computer programs designed to maximize efficient use of
workers result in constantly-changing schedules that wreak havoc on employees’ lives); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, TAKE ACTION: End Child Labor in US Agriculture, http://www.hrw.org/
support-care (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (describing how child labor laws are more relaxed for, or
exclude, agriculture and leave migrant children unprotected); OREGON PUBLIC BROADCAST-
ING, Oregon Farmworker Issues, OPB.ORG, http://www.opb.org/programs/oregonstory/
ag_workers/issues.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2014) (“[D]ue to lack of adequate childcare, many
children are forced to be in the fields with their parents.”); JOAN WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE
WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS MATTER 42-76 (2010) [hereinafter WILLIAMS,
RESHAPING] (describing challenges faced by modern-day workers). Of course, attending activi-
ties such as student/teacher conferences, school plays and concerts, and athletic events is a class
luxury far beyond the reach of this group of mothers (and fathers).
202. Today, the minimum wage is $7.25/hour. Wage and Hours Div., U.S. DEP’T. OF LA-
BOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/minimumwage.htm. When adjusted for inflation, that is $2 less
than it was in 1968. The Huffington Post, The Minimum Wage is Worth $2 Less Today Than It Was
In 1968, (June 20, 2013, 4:14pm), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/18/minimum-
wage-worth-less-than-1968_n_3461568.html. That legal minimum would have to be $13 to
have the same buying power today as it had fifty years ago. For a concrete description of the lived
experience of parenting for low-wage workers today, see WILLIAMS, RESHAPING, supra note 201,
at 42-76.
203. “Incomes for the highest-earning 1 percent of Americans soared 31 percent from
2009 through 2012, after adjusting for inflation . . . . For the rest of us, [income] inched up an
average of 0.4 percent.” Associated Press, Twelve Questions About Income Inequality: Who Are the 1
Percent?, OREGON LIVE, THE OREGONIAN, (January 27, 2014, 9:40AM), http://
www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2014/01/12_questions_about_income_ineq.html.
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that construct such women as both poor workers and bad mothers—and
thereby blame them for their own (and their children’s) situations. Narra-
tives depicting marginalized workers as unintelligent, irresponsible, and
lazy suggest that they’re qualified only for low-value, exploitative, and
strictly supervised work.204 And the image of these same women as irre-
sponsible, sometimes dangerous, and innately un-nurturing mothers has
been used to justify an economic system that separates them from their
children in ways that can compromise those children’s well-being.205
Then, when occasional (and virtually unavoidable) harms to children oc-
cur, those are constructed, of course, not as the inevitable result of unrea-
sonable work demands but instead as evidence of the very character flaws
that justified the economic exploitation to begin with.206
The stereotyping of privileged white women as “naturally” belong-
ing to the domestic world of mothering and low-income white women
and women of color as “naturally” belonging to the world of colonialist
work is illustrated by the public discussions surrounding the “workfare re-
forms” of the Clinton presidency. Clinton’s effort to “end welfare as we
know it”207 forced indigent recipients of Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) aid (as it became called under the new welfare regime) to
seek employment rather than stay home with their young children. Some
readers may remember the media’s frequent depiction, during that period,
of welfare recipients as lazy, selfish women who try to stay home to in-
dulge themselves in a life of leisure. In contrast, media depictions (during
the same period) of privileged women treated them as generous, self-sacri-
ficing mothers who both do and should forego careers for the benefit of
their children.208  Obviously, each of these contrasting stereotypes, in its
204. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1988). The footnotes of the Austin piece stun-
ningly illustrate both the wide range of abusive things employers do and say to their workers, and
their justifications for doing so.
205. For more on this point, see infra at text accompanying notes 191-93.
206. As should be clear from the discussion thus far, my point here is not to suggest that
such women are in fact guilty of poor or inadequate mothering. Rather, their accomplishments
as mothers, often attained in the face of significant barriers not of their own making, are effaced,
while they are blamed for the results produced by those barriers. For citations to studies about
derogatory attitudes often held towards mothers who are “racial minorities, poor, incarcerated,
single or divorced, or employed outside the home,” see KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 12,
at 43- 6. See also Twila L. Perry, Family Values, Race, Feminism and Public Policy, 36 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 345, 361 (1996) (comparing social perceptions of privileged stay-at-home mothers as
noble with those of mothers on public assistance as lazy); Fineman, supra note 92 (discussing
negative attitudes toward single mothers often expressed in poverty discourses).
207. Governor Bill Clinton, The New Covenant: Responsibility and Rebuilding the
American Community, Remarks to Students at Georgetown University (Oct. 23, 1991), availa-
ble at http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci4c81.html?kaid=127&subid=173&contentid=2783.
208. During the so-called “mommy wars” of the 1990s, privileged women (and others)
debated whether “women” (clearly meaning women like them) should stay home and care for
their children or pursue challenging careers. “Marilyn Quayle [wife of the vice-president under
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own way, legitimated harmful pro-work and anti-work policies and prac-
tices directed (respectively) at the two groups of women. But the ability of
the American imaginary to hold both views simultaneously—to strip poor
women of the financial support that would enable them to stay home with
their young children precisely at the same moment that privileged women
were being excoriated for working outside the home—vividly illustrates
how differential stereotypes justify relegating these groups of women to
starkly different relationships to work.
Focusing on African-American women in particular, it is tempting
to see the exploitative conditions under which they work today as a mod-
ern (and obviously less extreme) extension of slavery. After all, the ex-
ploitative use of women’s labor, to the detriment of their offspring, was
central to that institution. The “owners” of enslaved women appropriated
not only their physical labor but their reproductive labor as well—both by
forcing them to wet-nurse and by forcing them to serve as “breeders” who
reproduced and expanded the “property” of the master.209 Enslaved
women were often forced to forego nursing their own infants in order to
return to the fields or wet-nurse other children.210  And many of their
offspring suffered the complete loss of their mothers through forced sale—
perhaps the ultimate harm to a child. All of these deprivations were, of
course, legitimated by reference to stereotypes of enslaved people as sub-
human and incapable of “normal” human connections.211
George H.W. Bush] champion[ed] the fact that she gave up her law career for the sake of her
family, [while] Hillary Clinton defend[ed] her decision to combine the two.”  Lynda Richard-
son, No Cookie-Cutter Answers in ‘Mommy Wars’; Women Are Struggling With Their Choices About
Having Jobs or Staying Home, N.Y. TIMES (1992), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/
02/nyregion/no-cookie-cutter-answers-mommy-wars-women-are-struggling-with-their-
choices.html?action=click&module=Search®ion=searchResults&pagewanted=2&pagewanted
=print. Those who stayed home admitted to feeling a bit threatened by the “high-powered
career[s]” of those who didn’t. Id. But 49% of stay-at-home mothers in one survey said that
“employed mothers did not spend enough time with their children.” Id. The assumption that
such women might be harming their kids is captured by the comment of one woman inter-
viewed for the Richardson article: “Since mothers haven’t been working full time for that many
years, we have yet to see the results of the upbringing of the children. . . . We don’t know what
these children are going to be like but it’s hard to imagine it’s going to be terrific.”) In contrast,
the debate over “welfare reform” was striking in its failure to consider the possibility that forcing
poor mothers to leave home might be harmful to their small children. See, e.g., White Ghetto,
NEWSWEEK MAG., May 29, 1994, available at http://www.newsweek.com/white-ghetto-188856
(criticizing the “twin totems of the welfare debate[,] . . . [g]etting married and getting a job,”
by noting (disturbingly) that some fathers might be more harmful to a family than helpful, but
saying nothing about whether forcing the mother out of the home could harm her young
children).
209. ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 24-28.
210. See id., (discussing slave owners’ view of female slaves as producers and reproducers,
but not as mothers or nurturers); see also LINDA M. BLUM, AT THE BREAST: IDEOLOGIES OF
BREASTFEEDING AND MOTHERHOOD IN THE CONTEMPORARY UNITED STATES 21-22, 26
(1999).
211. ROBERTS, supra note 18, at 24–28.
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In summary, it is only white, privileged women who have tradition-
ally been stereotyped as “natural” mothers and consigned to the domestic
role. In contrast, from slavery to the modern-era welfare-to-work reforms,
racially and economically marginalized women have often been forced
(whether through physical compulsion or extremely limited economic op-
tions) to work for others under conditions that disadvantage their own
offspring.212 These practices have transformed certain aspects of mother-
hood—including the right to be able to survive (at least economically and
sometimes literally) without facing serious risks to your children’s well-
being—into class and race privileges, privileges that racially and economi-
cally marginalized women have often been denied.
Moreover, that denial has directly benefitted exploitative employers,
and (as I have noted) has been justified by reference to a raced and classed
discourse of colonization213—a discourse that suggests both that such
women are innately suited for exploitative labor and that their inherent
nature (not the demands of the work itself—or other factors such as poor
school systems) is the major barrier to their children’s successful
upbringing.214
As is discussed in the next section, the ACA is likely to perpetuate
the relegation of economically privileged and low-income women to do-
mestic and colonialist relationships to work, respectively. In so doing, it
will reinforce stereotypes of privileged women as nurturing, and low-in-
come women as self-interested, inadequate mothers.
B. Why the ACA is Likely to Reinforce Longstanding Women’s Work
Roles and Invite Women-Blaming in the Process
[W]e worry that breastfeeding will devolve into a privilege reserved for
middle-class and upper-middle-class women whose particular skills are
more in demand in a given labor market. By contrast, women from
lower economic strata will be denied access to breastfeeding in the work-
212. See supra, Part III.
213. Again, I use the word “colonization” here to suggest that exploitative relationships
similar to those that characterized the colonial enterprise—in which the United States  and other
foreign powers subjugated the indigenous populations and appropriated the natural resources of
colonized regions for their own benefit,—can be found in pockets of marginalized communities
and populations within the territorial United States. See ÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL, COLONIALISM:
A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 5-7, 11, 15 (2005).
214. These exploitative economic and social arrangements have of course not only been
allowed but have even been facilitated by legal rulings and legal discourse. See Jane C. Murphy,
Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare “Reform,” Family, and Criminal Law,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 734 (1998) (arguing that “both political and public rhetoric have
reflected a broader consensus that poor women should spend their time working rather than
caring for their children”).
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place and have to face an increasing social stigma associated with being a
nonbreastfeeding mother. – Kedrowski & Lipscomb215
The new accommodation regime is likely to reinforce both of the roles
historically ascribed to women, the domestic role and—especially—the
colonized role. As previously discussed, if the law indirectly encourages
increased accommodation of lactation in professional workplaces (as pre-
dicted here), many privileged women might be able to successfully com-
bine work and lactation.216  Even those who aren’t that lucky will often be
able to afford staying home, and some of them can be expected to do so.
Thus, when accommodation is inadequate, it will sometimes reinforce
their traditional domestic role.
More central to the argument here, the exploitative relationship to
work historically imposed upon less privileged women is unlikely to be
significantly affected by the ACA. Such women are unlikely to receive
meaningful accommodation and are unlikely to be able to stay home to
nurse instead.217 So they will often continue to work and forego
breastfeeding their children, even if they have concluded that breast milk is
the most beneficial form of infant nutrition.218
Moreover, when low-income women and women of color choose
not to breastfeed, violating modern norms of “scientific motherhood,”
they will risk being stigmatized as both “bad” mothers and noncompliant
patients.219  In fact, as breastfeeding increasingly becomes associated with
conscientious, good motherhood, and the lower breastfeeding rates of
marginalized mothers begin to be labeled a public health problem,220 the
risk increases that such women’s choices will be seen as evidence of igno-
rance and poor parenting—and therefore as deserving of disciplinary sur-
veillance and regulation. It is no surprise, then, that Bernice L. Hausman
215. KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 12, at 127.
216. Their significantly higher rates of breastfeeding than other women’s suggest that many
privileged white women currently either are adequately accommodated or refrain from working
while breastfeeding.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 166-175.
218. One woman, a former cashier, was quoted in the New York Times as saying, “I feel
like I had to choose between feeding my baby the best food and earning a living.” Kantor, supra
note 176.
219. Cf. HAUSMAN, supra note 20, at 40 (“[T]he norms of mothering developed in con-
junction with ‘scientific motherhood’ are intimately linked to white, middle-class expectations
of proper maternal submission to medical authority.”). See also Nancy Ehrenreich, The Coloniza-
tion of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 519-20 (1993) (discussing stigmatization of women who
refuse to “follow doctors’ orders”).
220. Arthur I. Eidelman & Richard J. Schanler, Breastfeeding and the Use of Human Milk,
American Academy of Pediatrics, Breastfeeding and the Use of Human Milk, 129 PEDIATRICS e827,
e837 (2012), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/early/2012/02/22/peds.2011-3552
(“Recently, published evidence-based studies have confirmed and quantitated the risks of not
breastfeeding. Thus, infant feeding should not be considered as a lifestyle choice but rather as a
basic health issue.”).
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starts her book on breastfeeding in American culture with the story of an
African-American woman on welfare, Tabitha Walrond, who was charged
with recklessly causing her child’s death when the breastfed baby died due
to failure to thrive. (Walrond was ultimately convicted of negligent homi-
cide.)221 Hausman compares Walrond’s treatment (and the discourse that
legitimated it) with the considerably more charitable treatment (and the
discourses surrounding it) of economically and racially privileged
breastfeeding women who accidentally starve their babies.222
Walrond’s story illustrates the risk that lactation promotion efforts
will focus on “educating” and controlling individual women, paying inad-
equate attention to the structural and economic factors that might account
for differential breastfeeding practices.223 Nor is consideration likely to be
given to many women’s historical experience of the workplace as a site of
economic exploitation, sexualized mothering, and disciplinary surveil-
lance—all of which (as discussed above) might deter those women from
bringing intimate family matters such as breastfeeding into that space to
begin with.224  For all of these reasons, a new regime of limited accommo-
dation is unlikely to encourage low-income and African-American
women to breastfeed and in fact might reinforce stereotypes of such
women as selfish and irresponsible mothers. In this context, it is important
to be mindful of Angela Davis’ observation many years ago that privileges
for powerful women often morph into duties for the less powerful.225
Walrond’s case is a vivid reminder of how mothering “advice” given to
privileged women can turn into criminal prosecutions of less powerful,
more stigmatized women—and of how harmful conditions produced by
structural inequality can be obfuscated by a discourse of personal individ-
ual “choice.”
Thus, it might be appropriate to ask whether the lower rates of
breastfeeding among African-Americans represent an act of resistance by
some women to the medical and governmental surveillance of their moth-
ering.226 As one example of such surveillance, consider the following
221. HAUSMAN, supra note 20, at 33–34. Of course, Walrond’s case shows that, even when
such women follow mothering dictates, they might still be treated as deviants.
222. Id. at 33–36.
223. In general, educational information is much more available to women than material
support for breastfeeding—which, as Hausman notes, can make “education” seem an awful lot
like “exhortation.” HAUSMAN, supra note 20, at 87.
224. For African-American women, the workplace has historically often been a place of
discrimination and disrespect, while the home has been a refuge from work—a place of safety
and fulfillment. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 AM.
U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 20-21 (1993) (“Black women historically experienced work outside the
home as an aspect of racial subordination and the family as a site of solace and resistance to white
oppression.”); WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 58, at 167.
225. Cf. DAVIS, supra note 19 (discussing contraception).
226. For one discussion of how disciplinary surveillance of women’s reproductive behavior
constructs some groups as deviant, justifying coercive interventions into their reproductive lives,
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statement by a nursing advocate: “ ‘It cannot be blamed on society or the
medical profession when a woman cannot accept [breastfeeding] as part of
the biologic role of a mother.’”227 Or, the concern expressed by a coun-
selor at a health clinic for poor teenagers, who bemoaned the fact that teen
mothers were “pushed by their own parents to return to school or work
rather than to breast-feed.”228 When breastfeeding is naturalized as the
“appropriate” role of all mothers, no matter what their personal prefer-
ences or socioeconomic circumstances, then those who have historically
been stereotyped as bad mothers face serious risks, whether they avoid the
practice (and can be criticized for not choosing what is “best” for their
child) or engage in it (and can be punished, like Walrond was, for doing it
“badly”). It is not surprising, then, that such women might try to avoid it
altogether. As Hausman has noted, “It is unlikely . . . that any medical
campaign to promote breastfeeding will succeed . . . if physicians convey
the notion that breastfeeding is the mode of infant feeding proper to the
female biological role.”229
Nor are breastfeeding practices likely to change if the solution is seen
to lie in reforming individual women’s decision-making processes, rather
than in changing the social and material circumstances under which their
decisions are made. As one author has noted, “federal breastfeeding policy
is heavy on symbolic expressions of support, but weak in terms of actual
support for women wishing to breastfeed.”230 And, as the discussion in
Part III illustrates, that flaw has not fundamentally changed with passage of
the ACA. With so much still left to the discretion of employers and the
abilities of individual women to negotiate (and afford) adequate accommo-
dations, the potential is great that women will be blamed for decisions that
are an inevitable result of the circumstances in which they live and work.
This victim-blaming has found expression, for example, in the
“choice” discourse that courts sometimes use in breastfeeding decisions,
constructing a woman’s demands for meaningful workplace equality as in-
stead demands to be allowed to provide any and all child care that she feels
is good for her child (as if that would be such a terrible thing to structure
workplaces to accomplish!). Consider, for example, Barrash v. Bowen,231 a
Fourth Circuit case in which the plaintiff alleged that other employees had
been granted sick leave of more than six months, while her request for six-
months’ unpaid leave to breastfeed was denied (even though the company
policy allowed such leaves to be granted for childcare reasons on a discre-
see Ehrenreich, Colonization of the Womb, supra note 219, at 519-21(discussing court-ordered
Cesarean sections).
227. HAUSMAN, supra, note 20, at 84 (quoting Ruth Lawrence).
228. Jules Law, The Politics of Breastfeeding: Assessing Risk, Dividing Labor, 25 SIGNS 407, 407
(2000) (citation omitted).
229. HAUSMAN, supra note 20, at 88.
230. KEDROWSKI & LIPSCOMB, supra note 12, at 85.
231. Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1988).
112 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 20:65
tionary basis). The Fourth Circuit overturned the trial court’s ruling for
plaintiff, stating that she did not have a “right to be let alone while she
cares for her baby in the manner she thinks best.”232 “[T]he measure of
any duty of reasonable accommodation,” the court primly stated, “is not
the same as the measure of the mother’s right to care for her child as she
pleases.”233
Constructing this mother as a demanding, selfish employee, these
quotes lead to the inescapable conclusion that the court viewed plaintiff’s
request for equal accommodation as unreasonable. In so labeling plaintiff’s
request for leave (and overturning the ruling in her favor), the appellate
court essentially blamed the mother for the employer’s apparently gender-
biased practice of leave-granting.234 In so doing, such rulings trivialize the
public health and gender equality consequences of employers’ resistance to
accommodating nursing mothers.235 Moreover, given that wanting the
best for one’s child is the essence of the traditional maternal selflessness
norm, in treating such an attitude as improper for workers, the court im-
plicitly treats working outside the home as incompatible with mothering.
Its statements convey the distinct impression that selfless dedication to
one’s offspring directly conflicts with being sufficiently dedicated to one’s
work. Ironically, the stereotype of the plaintiff as a bad worker is precisely
what enables her employer to impair her ability to be a good mother.
Such punitive and suspicious attitudes towards breastfeeding women
(one sometimes gets the sense from judicial discourse that the judge be-
lieves the woman is trying to get away with something)236 reflect a decon-
textualized understanding of women’s behavior that fails to appreciate the
myriad influences on women’s choices previously described here.237  They
also strongly suggest that harmful cultural attitudes towards breastfeeding
might generate harsh judicial attitudes towards lactating women—attitudes
that could continue to influence holdings under the ACA. Finally, cases
like Barrash reinforce the very stereotypes that have justified relegating
working-class and poor women to inflexible and demanding workplaces to
begin with. Constructing the plaintiff as a selfish worker who unreasonably
232. Id. at 932.
233. Id.
234. The employer claimed that the plaintiff’s accommodation request was denied because
of a new policy to reduce unpaid leaves.  But the plaintiff introduced data showing that the
number of leaves granted to men increased during the same period. Id. at 931. The district court
found that the leave reduction policy had a disparate impact on young mothers. Id.
235. In fact, throughout its opinion, the Fourth Circuit treated plaintiff’s behavior not as
principled and determined assertions of her legal rights but rather as stubborn insubordination.
See, e.g., id., at 930 (stating that “management had the discretionary authority to grant leave
without pay and to determine its duration. . . [E]mployees . . . may not dictate the exercise of
that discretionary, managerial function.”)
236. See, e.g., id. at 932 (“to care for her child as she pleases”) (emphasis added).
237. See supra Part II(B)(3).
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pushes the boundaries, the case blames the victim for her employer’s ex-
ploitation of her labor and harming of her children.
In summary, the joint operation of law and culture in this area is
likely to enforce upon low-income white women and women of color
(and, to a lesser extent, upon privileged white women as well) the very
roles that have historically served as the basis of their respective experiences
of subordination. And the decisions women make about work and
breastfeeding under the ACA, while incentivized by the legal and cultural
context in which they find themselves, are likely to be perceived as the
result of their inherent natures. Privileged women will probably continue
to be stereotyped as “natural homemakers” concerned for their children,
while marginalized women will continue to be perceived as bad workers
requiring strict regulation and as irresponsible mothers who make poor
parenting choices.
The end result is a society that defines breastfeeding as central to
good mothering but then prevents the very women who have been stereo-
typed as bad mothers from engaging in the practice. In a tight, self-referen-
tial circle, the very stereotype that has historically justified the exploitation
of such women in regimented, low-paying workplaces will not only con-
sign them to work situations unlikely to facilitate breastfeeding but also be
cited to blame them for any parenting “failures” necessitated by such work,
affirming their roles as both irresponsible mothers and exploitable workers.
CONCLUSION
La Leche League continues to promote full-time mothering to accom-
plish biological breastfeeding, just as feminist groups have largely sup-
ported full-time market work for women who are then expected to
outsource child care and housekeeping: both positions . . . need adjust-
ment. – Bernice Hausman238
The central message of this Article is that socially constructed as-
sumptions about women’s bodies, roles, and relationships to work could
significantly limit the positive impact of the ACA’s new breastfeeding pro-
visions, even possibly making them harmful to certain women. As has
been discussed, three dynamics combine to limit the benefits that one
might assume would flow from the statute’s accommodation mandate.239
First, the broad discretion that the act allocates to employers and courts
invites raced and classed decision making based on prevailing cultural atti-
tudes towards both breastfeeding and mothers who work. In fact, the nar-
row interpretation to which the ACA is susceptible, and which cultural
attitudes suggest is likely, could create incentives that enforce historically
238. HAUSMAN supra note 20, at 186.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 17-21.
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subordinating roles on low-income and blue-collar women—especially
those who are African-American.
Second, the law’s failure to provide material support for breastfeeding
workers, as well as its reliance upon negotiated arrangements, severely limit
the positive impact it is likely to have on low-income women. With little
bargaining power or resources at their disposal, low-income workers will
often be left with expensive and ungenerous “accommodations” that make
breastfeeding while employed extremely impracticable. Finally, to the ex-
tent that it sends a hortatory message about feeding breast milk without
making that reality possible for low-income women, the new law risks re-
stigmatizing such women as irresponsible mothers. Once those women
have a right to breastfeed, only they will be to blame if they do not do it.
In short, lactation could well become a new arena of disciplinary surveil-
lance of low-income women—as the Walrond case discussed by Hausman
presages.240
Indeed, the passage of the accommodation provision risks having the
same impact that inattention to cultural stereotypes has had in the repro-
ductive arena. The mainstream reproductive rights movement—and privi-
leged women in general—became complacent about the right to
terminate a pregnancy following Roe v. Wade,241 allowing the Supreme
Court to progressively eviscerate the substance of that right when no one
was looking.242  At the same time, they failed to challenge both the in-
creasing regulation of the reproductive lives of low-income women, espe-
cially women of color, and the stereotypes invoked to justify that
regulation.243 As I have discussed elsewhere,244 the end result of these de-
velopments is that we have a two-tiered system of abortion access—and
more generally, of reproductive rights and justice. Under that system, eco-
nomically privileged (primarily white) women have far greater ability to
control their reproductive processes, and are subjected to far fewer punitive
state efforts to control those processes, than their low-income (dispropor-
tionately nonwhite) counterparts.245
240. See discussion, supra notes 197–205.
241. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
242. See Lynne Henderson, Flexible Feminism and Reproductive Justice: An Essay in Honor of
Ann Scales, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 141, 149-53 (2013).
243. See Rigel Oliveri, Crossing the Line: The Political and Moral Battle over Late-Term Abor-
tion, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 397, 431 (1998) (discussing stereotypes of women who obtain
late-term abortions).
244. See Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 7, 9.
245. Of course, recent years have witnessed an explosion of restrictive abortion legislation,
including statutes (such as mandatory ultrasounds laws) that have triggered more vociferous ob-
jections from mainstream observers. See Henderson, supra note 244, at 151. But nevertheless,
abortion restrictions overall have had a markedly greater impact on low-income women. For
example, “TRAP” laws (Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers) have raised expenses and
driven clinics to close in such numbers as to make access to an abortion provider prohibitively
expensive and time-consuming for many women. Manny Hernandez, Abortion Law Pushes Texas
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Similarly, here, the conclusion that the ACA has “solved” the
breastfeeding problem could result in a system that protects low-wage
workers in name only, while indirectly but concretely increasing accom-
modations for privileged women. And just as stereotypes of low-income
women, especially women of color, have been used to justify serious re-
striction of their autonomy in the reproductive context,246so marginalized
workers could find themselves abandoned—and blamed for their own cir-
cumstances—now that they have statutory “protection.” Thus, while the
accommodation approach of the ACA is in some ways a step in the right
direction, in others it is also a dangerous placebo that could actually harm
the women it is designed to help.
The ACA appropriately recognizes that each lactating-woman-and-
nursing-child dyad is different.247 Highly specific standards defining the
nature of the accommodation required are therefore unlikely to be via-
ble—which is exactly why the ACA resorts to the general, discretion-
laden reasonable person standard. But the discussion above reveals the lim-
ited usefulness of such a broad standard where those exercising the discre-
tion are likely to be strongly affected by cultural attitudes inflected with
race and class bias. The fact that many non-office positions cannot fit
neatly into the statute’s regime248 further suggests that the challenges of
developing a detailed set of accommodation requirements may simply be
insurmountable. Allowing women a year of paid parenting leave may be an
infinitely more practical, humane, and equitable approach than the ACA’s
limited accommodation right.249 On-site day care centers and seniority
protection policies also come to mind.250
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Activists and attorneys need to push for a more concrete understand-
ing of all women’s circumstances, and more fundamental change in the
workplace, if they want to avoid entrenchment of a class-based, two-tiered
system of breastfeeding rights—a system that perpetuates, rather than un-
dermining, the longstanding, exploitative nature of many women’s rela-
tionships to work.
